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To the extent that a contracting state has no applicable double taxation agreement 
(“DTA”) in place, that contracting state will rely solely on its domestic law to regulate 
transfer pricing related matters. Many states, however, enter into DTAs that are 
intended to inter alia reduce the risk of economic double taxation. Most of these DTAs 
are based on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Model 
Tax Convention (the “OECD’s MTC”). Article 9 of the OECD’s MTC aims to prevent 
transfer pricing manipulation by associated enterprises, as well as to provide 
associated enterprises with relief from economic double taxation. However, Article 9 
is only applicable if  
“an enterprise of a contracting state participates … in the management, control or capital 
of an enterprise of the other contracting state, or the same persons participate … in the 
management, control or capital of an enterprise of a contracting state and an enterprise of 
the other contracting state.”1 
DTAs, however, generally do not define the terms contained in the phrase “participates 
in the management, control or capital.” This may result in uncertainty regarding the 
applicability of a DTA provision identical to Article 9 of the OECD MTC. This 
dissertation illustrates the possibility of economic double taxation arising as a result of 
a corresponding contracting state disallowing a requesting for a corresponding 
transfer pricing adjustment in terms of a DTA provision identical to Article 9(2) of the 
OECD MTC due to such state disagreeing with the initial primary adjustment. Such 
disagreement may arise due to differing interpretation of the term “associated 
enterprise.” 
It appears that there are at least two possible solutions to eliminating economic 
double taxation from arising as a result of a primary transfer pricing adjustment. The 
first being for contracting states to agree to an autonomous or universal definition of 
an associated enterprise (which would arguably require consensus amongst all 
contracting states that the context of Article 9 requires otherwise than to interpret the 
terms therein in accordance with the domestic law of a particular contracting state). 
The alternative would be for contracting states to apply the modified “new approach” 
1 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 29-30. 
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(that is, the DTA is to be interpreted in accordance with the contracting state applying 
the DTA), which would arguably require contracting states to ignore the existing 
paragraph 6 of the Commentary on Article 9 of the OECD MTC.2 
Considering the historical context of Article 9, together with the purpose thereof, it 
is concluded that “participation in management or capital” ought to be interpreted as 
meaning that a person requires a dominant level of participation in management or 
capital in order to be associated. 
Regarding “control,” it is concluded that the context of Article 9 (in the form of the 
Commentary to Article 9 3  and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (“”TPG”) 4 )
requires “control” to be interpreted as de facto control in the narrow sense. 
2 Which provides that a corresponding state is not obliged to make a corresponding transfer 
pricing adjustment if it disagrees with the initial transfer pricing adjustment.  
3 OECD “Commentary on Article 9: Concerning the taxation of associated enterprises” in 
Model tax convention on income and on capital (Full Version) 10 ed (2017) para 2.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction to the purpose of transfer pricing regulations 
The price that members of a multinational group of companies (“a group member”), 
which are taxed in separate states, charge and pay each other for goods or services 
is referred to as the transfer price. The mere fact that intra-group transactions take 
place enables Multinational Enterprises (“MNEs”) to benefit the group as a whole by 
allocating the group’s profits towards the group members that reside within states that 
impose tax at relatively low rates. This is because each group member is generally 
taxed separately by that group member’s resident state,5 coupled with the fact that 
when different entities are subject to common control, transfer prices are not 
determined by true market forces.6 
The fact that each group member is taxed separately by that group member’s 
resident state has given rise to the incentive for MNEs to apply transfer prices that are 
not at arm’s length, which is typically referred to as transfer mispricing.7 The following 
example will illustrate this point: 
 
Example: 
Company R is a beer retailer and company P is a beer producer. Company R is the sole 
shareholder of company P. Both companies reside in state A, which imposes income tax 
on its residents at 33%. Company P produces a case of beer at a cost of R100 and sells it 
to company R for R200. Company R incurs another R40 of distribution costs to sell a case 
of beer, which company R sells at R400 per case of beer. Company P, therefore, makes 
R100 profit per case and company R makes R160 profit per case, which would leave the 
group with a net profit of R174,20 per case.8 If company P were to relocate its residence to 
state B, which imposes tax at a rate of 3% on its residents, then the group’s net profit would 
be R204,20 per case.9  
 
5 Although the general rule is that entities are taxed on a residence basis, taxation on a source 
basis is also a possibility.  
6  G Cottani “Transfer pricing” (2014) IBFD Topical Analysis 
<https://www.africataxjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/An-Overview-of-Transfer-
Pricing-by-IBFD-1.pdf> (accessed 22-04-2020). 
7 The terms “transfer mispricing” and “transfer pricing manipulation” are used interchangeably 
in this dissertation. 
8 Group net profit after income tax = [company P’s profit per case – 33%] + [company R’s profit 
per case – 33%]. 
9 Group net profit after income tax = [company P’s profit per case – 3%] + [company R’s profit 





Although the example above shows how a MNE can increase its profits, there is 
nothing illegal in structuring one’s affairs to ensure one pays only the amount of tax 
that one owes. 
As mentioned above, due to the fact that each group member is generally taxed 
separately by each respective group member’s resident state, “the allocation of 
[profits] with respect to MNEs can have a major impact on the tax revenue of individual 
states.”10 The following example, which refers to the previous example with company 
P and company R, will illustrate the benefits that a MNE can accrue from manipulating 
its transfer prices. 
 
Example: 
Company R still resides in state A and company P still resides in state B. In this instance, 
however, company R pays company P R360 per case instead of R200 per case. Therefore, 
company P now makes R260 per case and company R no longer makes a profit for selling 
a case of beer. Although the group profit per case of beer sold will still amount to R260, the 
group’s net profit will be R252,20 per case11 instead of R204,20 per case. The increase in 
net profit is directly attributable to the decreased tax liability in state A. The decreased tax 
liability is due to an increase in the MNEs profits being allocated to company P, residing in 
state B, which only imposes tax at 3% instead of 33% as done by state A. Thus, by paying 
company P more for each case, which enabled company R to shift its profits to company 
P, the group has increased the group’s net profit.  
 
It seems evident that the main purpose of transfer pricing regulations is to protect a 
state’s tax base from artificial, or manipulated, profit shifting.12 In arduous economic 
conditions, putting increased pressure on the fiscus, this purpose has become 
amplified.  
 
10 G Kofler “Article 9: Associated Enterprises” in E Reimer & A Rust (eds) Klaus Vogel on 
Double Taxation Conventions (2015) 579 594. 
11 Group net profit after income tax= [company P’s profit per case – 3%] + [company R’s profit 
per case – 33%]. 
12  The other purpose of transfer pricing regulations is to promote neutrality between 
independent enterprises and associated enterprises by preventing associated enterprises 
from enjoying a tax advantage that an independent enterprise cannot enjoy, giving rise to a 
distortion in their relative competitive positions. (RSJ Dwarkasing Associated enterprises: A 
concept essential for the application of the arm’s length principle and transfer pricing LLD 





Transfer pricing regulations are not only found in states’ domestic legislative 
provisions, but also in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (“OECD MTC”), which is generally 
used by most contracting states as a model when contracting states negotiate and 
enter into DTAs.13 In addition to the purpose of domestic transfer pricing provisions 
(that is; protecting a state’s tax base), the transfer pricing regulations contained in 
Article 9 of the OECD MTC also aims to avoid international economic double taxation14 
from arising,15 which would hinder cross-border transactions and the movement of 
capital.16 17 
 
1.2 Transfer pricing regulations 
1.2.1 Domestic legislation 
Although the general point of departure is that an enterprise’s income is to be taxed 
by the state in which that enterprise resides, most states have introduced domestic 
legislation that aims to prevent transfer pricing manipulation to protect the state’s tax 
base. Transfer pricing manipulation has been defined as “the over or under-invoicing 
of related party transactions in order to … exploit cross-border differences in [tax] 
rates.”18 Transfer pricing regulations aim to overcome this risk by enforcing “connected 
persons” or “associated enterprises” to apply the arm’s length principle. The arm’s 
length principle is best explained as follows: 
 
13 Since the OECD MTC is used as a model, provisions contained in a DTA often derive from 
the provisions contained in the OECD MTC. 
14 International double taxation is the unwanted consequence that arises due to an overlap in 
two states’ jurisdiction to tax, in other words separate states tax the same income. International 
double taxation can either be in the form of economic double taxation or juridical double 
taxation. Economic double taxation is the taxation of the same income (by more than one 
jurisdiction) in the hands of different persons, whereas juridical double taxation is the taxation 
of the same income (by more than one jurisdiction) in the hands of the same person. J Rogers-
Glabush IBFD international tax glossary 6 ed (2009) 112. 
15  OECD Transfer pricing guidelines for multinational enterprises and tax administrations 
(2017) 202. 
16 15. 
17 See the text to part 1 2 2 of this chapter for further details pertaining to Article 9 of the OECD 
MTC. 
18 L Eden “Taxes, transfer pricing and the multinational enterprise” in AM Rugman & TL Brewer 






“[T]he arm’s length principle can be tied to the concept that … before purchasing a product 
at a given price, independent enterprises normally would be expected to consider whether 
they could buy the same product on otherwise comparable terms and conditions but at a 
lower price from another party.”19 
 
Transfer pricing regulations usually allow tax authorities to adjust the actual price 
to the arm’s length price. Such an adjustment may give rise to economic double 
taxation to the extent that the taxpayer whose profits have been adjusted upwards will 
be liable for tax on that adjusted amount that has already been taxed in that taxpayer’s 
foreign associated enterprise’s hands. If the other contracting state agrees with this 
primary adjustment, then an applicable DTA provision that is based on Article 9(2) of 
the OECD MTC would allow a corresponding adjustment is to be made by that other 
contracting state in order to avoid economic double taxation from arising. Article 9(2) 
of the OECD MTC provides as follows: 
 
“Where a Contracting State includes in the profits of an enterprise of that State – and taxes 
accordingly – profits on which an enterprise of the other Contracting State has been 
charged to tax in that other State and the profits so included are profits which would have 
accrued to the enterprise of the first-mentioned State if the conditions made between the 
two enterprises had been those which would have been made between independent 
enterprises, then that other State shall make an appropriate adjustment to the amount of 
the tax charged therein on those profits.” 20 
 
The fact that every state implements its own transfer pricing legislation, however, 
means that an overlap in jurisdiction to tax could arise. In other words, one state may 
consider a corresponding transfer pricing adjustment not to be applicable due to that 
state having a different interpretation of what constitutes an associated enterprise. 
This position is supported by the Commentary21 on Article 9 of the OECD MTC, which 
provides the following: 
 
19 OECD Transfer pricing guidelines para 1.40. 
20 OECD Model tax convention on income and on capital (Full Version) I and II 10 ed (2017) 
29-30. 
21 Paragraph 3 of the Introduction to the OECD MTC provides that “member countries, when 
concluding or revising bilateral conventions, should conform to this Model Convention as 
interpreted by the Commentaries thereon … and their tax authorities should follow these 






“[A corresponding] adjustment is not automatically to be made in State B simply because 
the profits in State A have been increased … State B is therefore committed to make an 
adjustment of the profits of the affiliated company only if it considers that the adjustment 
made in State A is justified both in principle and as regards the amount.”22 
 
Accordingly, the Commentary above provides that a contracting state may refuse 
to make a corresponding transfer pricing adjustment to the extent that it does not 
consider the primary adjustment, which was made by the other contracting state, to 
be justified in principle. This is illustrated in the following example: 
 
Example: 
Company R resides in state A and company P resides in state B. Assume that state B only 
considers one to be an associated enterprise if one of the companies is a majority 
shareholder of the other company, but state A has a broader definition of the term 
associated enterprise that includes companies that are at least 90% dependent on another 
particular company for the supply of goods. If company R was not a majority shareholder 
of company P, but company R merely depended solely on company P to provide it with 
stock, then state A would regard companies R and P as associated enterprises. This would, 
in terms of state A’s domestic legislation, entitle state A to adjust the price charged and 
paid between companies R and P for the goods that they sold to or purchased from each 
other. If state B were to omit to do a corresponding transfer pricing adjustment, then 
international economic double taxation would arise as the same profit, although not in the 
hands of the same person, would then be taxed twice.  
 
The interpretation of the phrase “associated enterprise” is also material when 
considering the second leg of justification required by the Commentary in order for a 
corresponding adjustment to be made (that is; the corresponding state must agree 
with the primary adjustment as regards the amount). This is due to the fact, as pointed 
 
conventions that are based on the Model Convention.” Based on this introduction contained 
in the OECD MTC, it appears that the Commentary to the OECD MTC is intended to be used 
as a contextual, interpretive tool when applying DTAs that are modelled after the OCED MTC. 
Although South Africa is not a member of the OECD, South Africa is an observer of the 
OECD’s Committee of Fiscal Affairs. According to Olivier and Honiball South African courts 
have accepted that the Commentary may be used in the interpretation of DTAs despite SA 
not being an OECD member. L Olivier & Honiball M International tax: A South African 
perspective 4 ed (2008) 311. 





out by academics, that the “concept of associated enterprises is essential for the 
application of the arm’s length principle, which is the internationally recognised tax 
standard for transfer pricing.”23 Without a mutual interpretation of what constitutes an 
associated enterprise, application of the methods used to determine an arm’s length 
price will give rise to varied results. This is because almost all the transfer pricing 
methods provided by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
Transfer Pricing Guide (“OECD TPG”)24 require one to make some form of comparison 
between prices charged by independent entities and associated enterprises. 
 
1.2.2 The OECD Model Tax Convention on the arm’s length principle 
To the extent that a contracting state has no applicable DTA in place, that 
contracting state will rely solely on its domestic law to regulate transfer pricing related 
matters. Many states, however, enter into DTAs that are intended, inter alia, to reduce 
 
23 R Dwarkasing “The concept of associated enterprises” (2013) 41 Intertax 412-429, 412. 
24 SARS’ Practice Note 7 provides for the status of the OECD Guidelines in SA (which is that 
the OECD TPG should be followed in the absence of specific guidance in terms of this Practice 
Note, the provisions of section 31 or the tax treaties entered into by South Africa). Although 
the Practice Note is not law, it does fall within the ambit of a practice generally prevailing as 
defined by the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 (“TAA”). A “practice generally prevailing” is 
“a practice set out in an official publication regarding the application or interpretation of a tax 
Act” (as provided by section 1 of the TAA as read with section 5(1) of the TAA). The term 
“official publication” is defined in s1 of the TAA and includes “a practice note issued by a senior 
SARS official or the Commissioner”. In terms of section 99(1) of the TAA, SARS is barred from 
issuing an additional assessment if the amount which should have been assessed to tax under 
the preceding assessment was, in accordance with the practice generally prevailing at the 
date of the preceding assessment, not assessed to tax; or the full amount of tax which should 
have been assessed under the preceding assessment was, in accordance with the practice, 
not assessed. Put simply, although the OECD Guidelines are not law in SA, SARS cannot 





the risk of double taxation.25 South Africa’s DTAs are generally based on the OECD’s 
MTC.26  
Article 9(1) of the OECD’s MTC provides the following: 
  
“Where  
a) an enterprise of a contracting state participates … in the management, control or 
capital of an enterprise of the other contracting state, or 
b) the same persons participate … in the management, control or capital of an 
enterprise of a contracting state and an enterprise of the other contracting state, 
and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their 
commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made between 
independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have 
accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, 
may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly.”27 
 
Article 9(1) of the OECD’s MTC clearly aims to prevent transfer pricing manipulation 
by associated enterprises. Preventing transfer pricing manipulation is to be done by 
bringing all MNEs transfer pricing policies in line with the economic realities of their 
respective transactions. This can be achieved by ensuring that the transfer price 
imposed does not differ from the price that would have been set by independent 
entities.28 However, Article 9(1) is only applicable if  
 
“a) an enterprise of a contracting state participates … in the management, control or capital 
of an enterprise of the other contracting state, or b) the same persons participate … in the 
management, control or capital of an enterprise of a contracting state and an enterprise of 
the other contracting state.”29 
 
 
25 Double taxation is the unwanted consequence that arises due to an overlap in two states’ 
jurisdiction to tax, in other words separate states both want to tax the same income. Double 
taxation can either be in the form of economic double taxation or juridical double taxation. 
Economic double taxation is the taxation of the same income in the hands of different persons, 
whereas juridical double taxation is the taxation of the same income in the hands of the same 
person. J Rogers-Glabush IBFD international tax glossary (2009) 112. 
26 ITC 1503 (1990) 53 SATC 342 348; ITC 1848 (2010) 73 SATC 170 para [12]; ITC 1878 
(2015) 77 SATC 349 para [14]. See also CSARS v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All SA 15 (SCA) 
para [18] the court referred to SIR v Downing 1975 (4) SA 518 (A).   
27 OECD Model tax convention 29-30. 
28 Also referred to as an arms-length price. 





In other words, Article 9(1) is only applicable if associated enterprises transact with 
each other. A transfer pricing adjustment, in terms of Article 9(1), can therefore only 
take place if the contracting parties are associated enterprises. This amplifies the need 
for clarity on what constitutes an associated enterprise. 
The provision, however, does not define the characteristics required to trigger the 
existence of an associated enterprise (that is; management, control or capital). Article 
3(2) of the OECD MTC will therefore also need to be considered. This provision 
provides specific rules that are to apply when interpreting terms that are undefined in 
the applicable DTA. Article 3(2) provides the following: 
“As regards the application of the Convention at any time by a Contracting State, any term 
not defined therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires or the competent authorities 
agree to a different meaning pursuant to the provisions of Article 25, have the meaning that 
it has at that time under the law of that State for the purposes of the taxes to which the 
Convention applies, any meaning under the applicable tax laws of that State prevailing over 
a meaning given to the term under other laws of that State.” 
 
Considering that the terms contained in Article 9 are undefined, Article 3(2) will be 
of relevance when interpreting Article 9 and will therefore also need to be considered.  
On the assumption that the competent authorities have not agreed to a different 
meaning, Article 3(2) provides one with two alternative options when interpreting an 
undefined term. The first option is for the contracting state that is applying the DTA to 
interpret the undefined term in accordance with the meaning that term has under the 
contracting state’s domestic law. The second option is to interpret the undefined term 
in accordance with its context. However such approach may only be applied in 
instances where the context of the provision requires the undefined term to be 
ascribed a meaning other than that meaning it has under the domestic law of the 
contracting state that is applying the provision. 
In addition to comprehending how to interpret the content of Article 9, which requires 
one to apply Article 3(2), the relationship between DTAs (with provisions identical to 
Article 9 of the OECD MTC) and domestic transfer pricing laws needs to be understood 
to understand what legal impact a DTA provision (which is identical to Article 9 of the 






1.3 Research question 
The general purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the interpretation of the 
term “associated enterprises” in Article 9 of the OECD MTC, as would more likely than 
not be applied by a South African court. More specifically, this dissertation will examine 
whether the fact that the OECD MTC does not define the terms contained in the phrase 
“participates in the management, control or capital” mean that Article 3(2) requires one 
to interpret the term in accordance with domestic legislation. Alternatively, whether the 
context of Article 9 of the OECD MTC provides otherwise and therefore requires one 
not to follow the domestic legislation’s definition of associated enterprise, and, if the 
latter is correct, how must one interpret the term “associated enterprise”. The 
assumption is made that the competent authorities have not agreed to a different 
meaning.  
 
1.4 Methodology and nature of this dissertation 
This dissertation will analyse the applicable academic literature, OECD materials, 
case law and other relevant documents that address the interpretation of Article 9. 
Firstly, academic literature, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna 
Convention”) 30  and court judgments addressing the relationship between DTAs, 
domestic legislation and the OECD MTC will be examined in order to clarify each 
respective instrument’s status.  
Thereafter the respective definitions used by different states to determine what 
constitutes an “associated enterprise” will be assessed. This will be done by studying 
the domestic legislation of a selection of states (which consists of South Africa, India, 
the USA, and the UK) dealing with transfer pricing and the definition of an associated 
enterprise.31 
This dissertation is written from a South African perspective. However, this 
dissertation will also require a comparative analysis. India has been chosen as one of 
the jurisdictions to discuss for a number of reasons. First, because “SARS has sought 
guidance from Indian Revenue Authorities who have experienced much success in 
 
30 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331. 
31 The South African Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, the UK’s Income and Corporation Tax Act of 





the realm of international transfer pricing.”32 The fact that India’s domestic transfer 
pricing legislation provides for a relatively broad concept of associated enterprise33 is 
the second main reason for choosing to analyse the Indian legislation. Discussing the 
legislative position in India will illustrate one method that has been identified as 
applicable amongst many states with emerging economies when defining what 
constitutes an associated enterprise. This definition goes beyond control in the form 
of shareholding or management by including de facto forms of control as well.34 
The position in the United Kingdom (“UK”) and the United States will also be 
addressed to allow for an analysis of two other methods of defining the concept of 
associated enterprise, one being a definition that is limited to control in shareholding 
or in management, and the other being a so-called “open ended concept based on 
control.”35 The purpose of this comparative analysis is to highlight that, to the extent 
that contracting states rely on their domestic law definitions to interpret what 
constitutes an associated enterprise, certain contracting states will be unable to agree 
with one another on what would constitute a justified transfer pricing adjustment (either 
in principle or as regards the amount).  
Academic literature supporting the arguments of academics such as Dwarkasing,36 
who argues that the term associated enterprise is to be given an autonomous 
interpretation, and Cottani,37 who argues that Article 3(2) requires one to interpret the 
term “associated enterprise” in accordance with domestic legislation, will be critically 
analysed so to assist in determining the preferred method in interpreting the term 
“associated enterprise”. OECD publications and academic literature addressing the 
purpose of the arm’s length principle will also be studied to determine the viability of 
an autonomous interpretation being considered a solution to this uncertainty of 
economic double taxation from arising. 
 
32 T Spearman “Transfer pricing rules for South African domestic intergroup transactions” (23-
05-2013) SAIT News & Press: Transfer Pricing & International Tax 
<http://www.thesait.org.za/news/126410/Transfer-pricing-rules-for-South-African-domestic-
intergroup-transactions.htm> (accessed 22-04-2020). 
33 Cottani “Transfer pricing” (2014) IBFD Topical Analysis. 
34 Dwarkasing (2013) Intertax 425. 
35 425. 
36 Dwarkasing Associated enterprises. 






The OECD’s MTC, the OECD’s TPG and academic literature will be consulted in 
order to identify and understand the methods used to determine an arm’s length price. 
This will aid in highlighting what role the definition of associated enterprise plays in 
calculating an arm’s length price, and what consequences may possibly arise if this 
definition is inconsistent amongst different states. 
 
1.5 A brief overview of the main views regarding the interpretation of what 
constitutes an associated enterprise (for purposes of interpreting a DTA 
provision identical to Article 9 of the OECD MTC) 
The main views regarding the interpretation of what constitutes an associated 
enterprise (for purposes of interpreting a DTA provision identical to Article 9 of the 
OECD MTC) deals with the interpretation of a DTA provision, as opposed to domestic 
law provisions. 
According to Cottani, Article 9 of the OECD MTC provides that the trigger that gives 
rise to an enterprise being considered an associated enterprise is the existence of 
“participation in the capital or the management or control of another enterprise.”38 
Article 9, however, does not define the phrase “management, control or capital.39 
Cottani submits that control appears to be presented as something distinct from 
participation in management or capital.40 Cottani goes on to conclude that the term 
“control” (as well as the term “management” and “capital”) is undefined and must, 
therefore, be interpreted in accordance with Article 3(2) of the OECD MTC.41 This, 
according to Cottani, means that these undefined terms must be given the meaning 
contained in domestic legislation.  
Dwarkasing does not concur with the view submitted by Cottani. Instead, 
Dwarkasing argues that an autonomous interpretation of the term “associated 
enterprise” appears to exist. The premise of Dwarkasing’s argument arose from the 
1979 OECD Report stating that it is unnecessary to define the phrase “under common 
control” because a broad basis of the term’s understanding was assumed to exist.42 
 
38 Cottani “Transfer pricing” (2014) IBFD Topical Analysis. 
39 Cottani “Transfer pricing” (2014) IBFD Topical Analysis. 
40 Cottani “Transfer pricing” (2014) IBFD Topical Analysis. 
41 Cottani “Transfer pricing” (2014) IBFD Topical Analysis. 
42 Dwarkasing Associated enterprises 551; OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs. Report of the 





Dwarkasing then discusses his findings from a historical analysis to gain an insight as 
to what this broad understanding consisted of.  
After embarking on a historical analysis of Article 9 of the OECD MTC, Dwarkasing 
submits that “it [is] clear that ‘control’ is not a separate, independent criterion,”43 but 
rather it is a substitute for the phrase “dominating” as was used in Article 5 of the 
League of Nations Report of the Fiscal Committee to the Council (“1933 Report”).44 
Dwarkasing, therefore, concludes that an entity is only associated with another entity 
“if there is a participation in capital or management that can dominate or control the 
other company.” 
 
1.6 Overview of the content of this dissertation 
Before this dissertation can address the question of how one should interpret what 
constitutes an associated enterprise, clarity first needs to be provided on the legal 
status of domestic law, DTAs, Article 9 of the OECD MTC and the Commentary 
thereon for one to understand what legal effect, if any, the interpretation of the term 
“associated enterprise” has in South Africa (“SA”). Chapter 2 of this dissertation will 
also assess what happens in cases of conflict between a DTA and domestic 
legislation, which will be done by analysing the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (“Constitution”), case law and the Vienna Convention. Although this 
dissertation will be written from a South African perspective, this chapter will compare 
the approaches adopted by the other above-mentioned states as well. 
Chapter 3 will identify the different types of domestic interpretations of the concept 
“associated enterprise”. This will include, firstly, a concept of associated enterprise 
that is limited to control in the form of shareholding and management, which on the 
face of it appears to be applied by states such as the UK. Secondly, a definition of 
associated enterprise that is based on an open-ended concept of control, as applied 
by states such as the United States of America (“USA”), will also be included. Finally, 
a definition of associated enterprise that covers de jure control and de facto 
relationships, as applied by states such as India, will also be discussed.  
 
43 Dwarkasing Associated enterprises 569. 
44 League of Nations Report of the Fiscal Committee to the Council, Fourth Session, Doc No 





The purpose of chapter 4 is to propose a sound way of interpreting what constitutes 
an associated enterprise. In doing so this chapter will assess how to interpret Article 
9, which also requires an assessment of the application of Article 3(2). One of the aims 
of this chapter is, therefore, to establish what would constitute the context providing 
otherwise, therefore requiring one to rather apply an autonomous interpretation of a 
term instead of the domestic definition of a term. Once clarity has been provided on 
what would constitute the context providing otherwise, the dissertation will move on to 
establish whether the context of transfer pricing regulation indicates context that 
requires the application of an autonomous interpretation instead of applying domestic 
definitions.  
This will be followed by a conclusion, which will provide a summary of the findings 
of this dissertation. Furthermore, the conclusion will propose an interpretation of the 







CHAPTER 2: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOMESTIC LEGISLATION AND 
DOUBLE TAXATION AGREEMENTS 
2.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the purpose of this dissertation is to 
establish how to interpret the phrase “participat[ion] … in the management, control or 
capital” under Article 9 of a DTA (which mirrors the OECD MTC) from a South African 
perspective. Before addressing how to interpret a provision contained in a DTA, it is 
material for one to first have an understanding of what legal effect a DTA has 
domestically, particularly in instances where a DTA conflicts with domestic legislation. 
This chapter will consider the legal effect of a DTA, particularly in instances where 
a DTA conflicts with domestic legislation. This will be done by considering the legal 
status of a DTA, which will, in turn, be done by gleaning how DTAs are given 
enforceability. 
This analysis will be performed by considering the text of the SA DTAs, South 
African legal rules and jurisprudence, as well as academic texts pertaining to the legal 
status of DTAs in SA. Additionally, a comparative analysis will also be done to 
compare the South African legal position to the position in the USA, the UK, and 
India.45 
 
2.2 Legal status of a double taxation agreement 
Academics generally accept that the particular legal framework of a state must be 
taken into consideration when establishing the legal status of a DTA in that particular 
state.46 The method that international law is given legal effect to at a national level is 
of particular relevance for this purpose. 
The general consensus amongst academics is that two approaches exist to giving 
legal effect to a DTA within a state. These contrasting approaches are referred to as 
the monist and dualist approaches. States that follow a monist approach consider 
international law and domestic law as one single legal system, while states that follow 
a dualist approach consider international law and domestic law as distinct from one 
 
45 Although relevant to this chapter, the relationship between domestic Controlled Foreign 
Company (“CFC”) legislation and DTAs will not be addressed as it falls beyond the scope of 
this dissertation.  





another. 47  Monist systems, therefore, consider international law as directly 
enforceable domestically, without any need for domestication. On the other hand, 
dualist systems require international law to be domesticated by way of formal 
incorporation into domestic law before obtaining any enforceability domestically.48 
Although a DTA is treated as distinct from domestic law in dualist states, a DTA 
becomes part of domestic law in states that follow a dualist approach after a 
domestication process. 49  Dugard submits that three primary methods exist to 
domesticate a DTA.50 The first method that Dugard identifies is embodying the text of 
a DTA into an act of parliament.51 Secondly, Dugard notes that a DTA may form a 
schedule to a statute.52 Lastly, Dugard states that “an enabling Act of parliament may 
give the executive the power to bring a treaty into effect in [domestic] law by means of 
proclamation or notice in the Government Gazette.”53 
 
2.2.1 Giving legal effect to a double taxation agreement in South Africa  
On the face of it, it appears that the heading of almost all54 of the DTAs to which SA 
is a party to indicate the domestic procedures for DTAs to become enacted into South 
African law. This submission is premised on the preamble to South African DTAs, 
which refer to section 231(4) of the Constitution as well as section 108(2) of the Income 
Tax Act 58 of 1962 (“Income Tax Act”). The wording contained in the heading of a 
South African DTA generally provides the following: 
 
“In terms of section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (Act No 58 of 1962), read in 
conjunction with section 231(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
 
47 J Dugard International law: A South African perspective 4 ed (2011); G Ferreira & A Ferreira-
Snyman “The incorporation of public international law into municipal law and regional law 
against the background of the dichotomy between monism and dualism” (2014) 17 PER/PELJ 
1470-1496.  
48 Ferreira & Ferreira-Snyman” (2014) PER/PELJ 1470-1496.  
49 I du Plessis “Some thoughts on the interpretation of tax treaties in South Africa” (2012) 24 
SA Merc LJ 31–52 32. 
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(Act No 108 of 1996), it is hereby notified that the [DTA] has been entered into with the 
[Contracting State] and has been approved by Parliament in terms of section 231(2) of the 
Constitution.” 
 
It must be noted, albeit trite, that the key element of the South African legal system 
is that the South African Constitution is supreme. This is expressly provided for under 
section 2 of the Constitution, which provides that the “Constitution is the supreme law 
of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations 
imposed by it must be fulfilled.” An analysis of the relevant constitutional provisions 
pertaining to international agreements, that is section 231 of the Constitution, is 
therefore firstly required.  
Section 231 of the Constitution provides, inter alia, as follows:   
 
“(2)  An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by 
resolution in both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, 
unless it is an agreement referred to in subsection (3).  
 (3)  An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature, or 
an agreement which does not require either ratification or accession, entered into 
by the national executive, binds the Republic without approval by the National 
Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, but must be tabled in the 
Assembly and the Council within a reasonable time.  
 (4)  Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into 
law by national legislation; … 
 (5)  The Republic is bound by international agreements which were binding on the 
Republic when this Constitution took effect.”  
 
Subsection (2) read with subsection (5) clearly provides that an international 
agreement (such as a DTA) that has been approved by Parliament binds SA on an 
international level. A State’s failure to comply with the provisions of such an 
international agreement may possibly result in adverse consequences. This, however, 
does not mean that the international agreement automatically becomes part of South 
African domestic law. This is due to subsection (4) providing that an international 
agreement generally becomes law in SA only once such agreement is enacted into 
law by national legislation. In other words, a taxpayer cannot rely on the provisions 





law by the legislature. This argument was supported in the case of Glenister v 
President of the Republic of South Africa,55 wherein the court held the following: 
 
“In our view, the main force of section 231(2) is directed at the Republic’s legal obligations 
under international law, rather than transforming the rights and obligations contained in 
international agreements into home-grown constitutional rights and obligations. […] [T]he 
provision must be read in conjunction with the other provisions within section 231. Here, 
section 231(4) is of particular significance. […] the fact that section 231(4) expressly 
creates a path for the domestication of international agreements may be an indication that 
section 231(2) cannot, without more, have the effect of giving binding internal constitutional 
force to agreements merely because Parliament has approved them.”56 
 
In addition to section 231 of the Constitution, the preamble to most of SA’s DTAs 
also refer to section 108 of the Income Tax Act, which provides as follows: 
 
“(1)  The National Executive may enter into an agreement with the government of any 
other country, whereby arrangements are made with such government with a view 
to the prevention, mitigation or discontinuance of the levying, under the laws of the 
Republic and of such other country, of tax in respect of the same income, profits 
or gains, or tax imposed in respect of the same donation, or to the rendering of 
reciprocal assistance in the administration of and the collection of taxes under the 
said laws of the Republic and of such other country.  
 (2)  As soon as may be after the approval by Parliament of any such agreement, 
as contemplated in section 231 of the Constitution, the arrangements 
thereby made shall be notified by publication in the Gazette and the 
arrangements so notified shall thereupon have effect as if enacted in this Act.” 
[own emphasis] 
 
Since section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act (which is referred to in almost all of SA’s 
DTAs) requires a DTA to be approved by Parliament in order for the DTA to have legal 
effect, such approval, according to section 231 of the Constitution, will result in the 
DTA having effect as if enacted in the Income Tax Act. In other words, as articulated 
by Du Plessis, “[t]he Income Tax Act, therefore, constitutes the national legislation, 
 
55 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) para 181. 
56 This view, which formed part of the minority judgment, appears to have been supported by 






required by the Constitution, by which the DTT becomes part of domestic law.”57 It 
consequently seems apparent that SA domesticates DTAs by utilising enabling 
legislation. 
This view appears to be supported by South African courts,58 which have held that 
section 108 is an enabling provision that empowers government to domesticate a 
treaty into South African law. This is evident from the supreme court of appeal 
judgment in Krok v C:SARS,59 which held that “DTA[‘s] and the[ir] Protocol[s] … were 
concluded in terms of section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 read with 
section 231(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996”.  
 
2.3 Addressing conflict between a DTA and domestic legislation 
Akehurst has previously identified the following techniques to resolve a conflict 
between DTAs and domestic law: 
 
“the first technique is to make rules derived from one source prevail over rules derived from 
another source: lex surerior derogate inferiori. The second technique is to make later rules 
prevail over earlier rules: lex posterior derogate priori. […] The third technique is to make 
a particular rule prevail over a general rule: lex specialis derogate generali.”60 
 
The author hereof is of the view that the second and third technique identified by 
Akehurst are simply references to the ordinary principles of legislative interpretation. 
It appears that there may therefore only be two general methods to address the conflict 
between DTAs and domestic legislation, the first being that a state can provide for 
rules that provide that one rule prevails over another, and the second being applying 
the ordinary principles of legislative interpretation.  
Given that the South African legal system gives legal effect to DTAs by way of an 
enabling act of parliament that gives the executive the power to bring a treaty into 
 
57 I du Plessis A South African perspective on some critical issues regarding the OECD Model 
Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, with special emphasis on its application to trusts 
LLD dissertation, Stellenbosch University (2014) 112. 
58 Commissioner, South African Revenue Service v Van Kets 2012 3 SA 399 (WCC); CSARS 
v Tradehold Ltd 2013 4 SA 184 (SCA). 
59 2015 6 SA 317 (SCA). 
60 M Akehurst “The hierarchy of the sources of international law” (1976) 47 British Yearbook 





effect in [domestic] law61 , it seems appropriate to conclude that SA can be classified 
as a dualist state.62 From a South African perspective, the South African Constitutional 
Court unambiguously held in Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa63 
that “the incorporation of an international agreement creates ordinary domestic 
statutory obligations. Incorporation by itself does not transform the rights and 
obligations in it into constitutional rights and obligations.” In other words, “a treaty, 
once it is domesticated via legislation, has the same status as other legislation.”64 The 
reason for this, according to case law, is because DTAs are “enacted into law by 
national legislation, and can only be elevated to a status superior to that of other 
national legislation if Parliament expressly indicates its intent that the enacting 
legislation should have such status.”65  
On this point, Gutuza has previously highlighted that South African domestic 
legislation does not provide that the DTA will prevail over domestic legislation.66 SA 
therefore clearly does not apply specific laws that provide for DTAs to trump domestic 
law. Conflicts between the two are therefore not addressed in such a manner. 
Olivier and Honiball provide a logical explanation that, in the author’s view, clarifies 
the South African method of addressing a conflict between DTAs and domestic law. 
These academics note the following: 
 
“in light of the fact that s 108(2) provides that once a treaty has been approved by 
parliament and published in the Government Gazette it becomes part of domestic law, the 
South African common law rules for the interpretation of statutes would be applicable also 
to treaties. As a result, these rules will have to be applied to resolve the conflict to the extent 
that international interpretation rules were not of assistance.”67  
 
In other words, due to the way that treaties are domesticated in SA, the South 
African rules of interpreting legislation must be applied to resolve any conflict. The 
 
61 By proclamation or notice in the Government Gazette. 
62 Krok v C:SARS 2015 6 SA 317 (SCA) para 24. 
63 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) para 181. 
64 Du Plessis A South African perspective 113. 
65 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) para 100. 
66 T Gutuza “Tax treaties, the Income Tax Act and the Constitution – Trump or reconcile?” 
(2016) 3 SA Merc LJ 480 507. 





Constitutional Court also expressed this view in the Glenister minority judgment, which 
held as follows: 
 
“if there is a conflict between an international agreement that has been incorporated into 
our law and another piece of legislation, that conflict must be resolved by the application of 
the principles relating to statutory interpretation and superseding of legislation.”68 
 
Based on the view from the above-mentioned Constitutional Court judgment, which 
is also supported by numerous academics,69 it is clear that any conflict between a DTA 
and domestic legislation must be addressed by applying the ordinary rules of statutory 
interpretation. 
 
2.3.1 The “stencil argument”  
It is trite that states enter into DTAs with the aim of, inter alia, eliminating double 
taxation. According to Lang, DTAs “determine the extent to which each state may levy 
tax.” 70 Lang goes on to explain how this is done by noting that the contracting states 
will give up taxing rights.71 Although the purpose of Article 9 of a DTA that mirrors the 
OECD MTC is to address cases of economic double taxation (as opposed to allocating 
taxation rights between two states), such an article also puts limits on national tax 
authorities by “restricting a state’s right to make income adjustments under domestic 
law”72 (which may essentially result in giving up taxing rights over income that they 
would have been entitled to tax had the DTA not existed). These references to 
contracting states giving up taxing rights suggest that DTAs are intended to, at the 
very least, limit domestic tax laws in specific instances (that is; instances pertaining to 
the cross-border taxation of residents of two contracting states). 
 
68 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) para 101. 
69 Gutuza (2016) SA Merc LJ 483; Olivier & Honiball International tax 304. 
70 M Lang Introduction to the law of double taxation conventions 2 ed (2013) 30. 
71 30. 






According to Vogel, since the applicability of a DTA is confined to cross-border 
taxation of residents of the two contracting states, DTAs constitute special legislation 
(leges specialis).73 Vogel concludes as follows: 
 
“Thus according to the old rule “Lex specialis derogat legi generali” (“special legislation 
overrides general legislation”), treaties override the domestic tax law that is effective at the 
time of their implementation. Under a supplementary rule of “Lex posterior generalis non 
derogart legi priori speciali” (“later general legislation does not overrule earlier special 
legislation”), changes of domestic tax law normally will not affect existing treaties.”74 
 
In other words, DTAs “recognize that each contracting state applies its own 
[domestic] law, and then limit the contracting states' application of that law.”75 DTAs, 
therefore, restrict the applicability of domestic laws. Accordingly, Vogel submits that 
“a tax obligation exists only if and to the extent that, in addition to the requirements of 
domestic law, the treaty requirements also are satisfied.”76 In other words, the DTA is 
the agreed-upon stencil to the entire picture that is made by the domestic law.77  
Although not expressly stated, support for this view can be inferred from the 
Tradehold case where the court held the following: 
 
“Double tax agreements effectively allocate taxing rights between the contracting states 
where broadly similar taxes are involved in both countries. […] A double tax agreement 
thus modifies the domestic law and will apply in preference to the domestic law to the extent 
that there is any conflict.” 
 
Du Plessis has previously expressed that the court in Tradehold was cognisant of 
subsequent legislation’s impact on existing treaties. This is due to the court 
acknowledging that DTAs “are intended to encompass not only existing taxes but also 
 
73 K Vogel “The Domestic Law Perspective” in G Maisto (ed) Tax treaties and domestic law 
(2006) 3-12 3 
74 3. 
75  K Vogel “Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation” (1986) 4 International Tax & 
Business Lawyer 1-85 22. 
76 C de Pietro “Tax treaty override and the need for coordination between legal systems: 
Safeguarding the effectiveness of international law” (2015) 77 World Tax Journal 
<https://www.ibfd.org/sites/ibfd.org/files/content/pdf/Pay-per-view_wtj_2015_01_int_3.pdf> 
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taxes which may come into existence at later dates.” 78  Du Plessis, therefore, 
concludes that the Tradehold judgment “effectively stated that a DTA will always apply 
in preference to domestic law in the case of conflict.”79 
Other academics have also acknowledged that “[a]ll Article 9(1) [of a DTA that 
mirrors Article 9(1) of the OECD MTC] does is … restrict domestic law.”80 If “Article 
9(1) [of the] OECD MTC and the treaty rules corresponding to it did not in fact restrict 
domestic taxing rights, they would be superfluous.”81 This is because if Article 9 of a 
DTA (which mirrored Article 9 of the OECD MTC) did not restrict the domestic laws of 
the relevant Contracting states, then “…the unpalatable result would be that economic 
double taxation could systematically persist within the framework of Article 9.”82 The 
reason why economic double taxation would arise is because Article 9(2) only requires 
the other state to make a corresponding transfer pricing adjustment if it agrees with 
the primary adjustment in principle. In other words, if the other state does not agree 
that the parties were in fact associated and therefore subject to Article 9(1), then that 
other state will not alleviate the “associated” parties from economic double taxation. 
This would undermine the entire purpose of Article 9 of the OECD MTC, being to 
eliminate economic double taxation, which would make Article 9 superfluous.  
 
2.3.2 The elephant in the room: Glenister and Van Ketz 
Du Plessis notes that the Tradehold decision made no mention of the Glenister or 
Van Kets judgments.83 One of the issues in the Glenister case was the constitutional 
validity of the domestic legislation that gave rise to the creation of a special 
investigative unit known as the “Hawks”. 
One of the arguments raised to invalidate the legislation that established the Hawks 
was that the domestic legislation was unconstitutional because the Hawks lacked the 
necessary independence to be an effective corruption-fighting mechanism, as was 
 
78 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd 2012 3 All SA 15 
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required in terms of an international treaty that imposed an obligation to establish an 
independent anti-corruption agency.84 Although the case was not related to tax, the 
court in the Glenister case held that section 231 of the Constitution determines the 
legal status of an international agreement.85 Both the majority and minority judgments 
in Glenister held that “an international agreement that becomes law in our country 
enjoys the same status as any other [domestic] legislation.”86  
Unfortunately, however, the court went on to state that “[international agreements] 
can only be elevated to a status superior to that of other national legislation if 
Parliament expressly indicates [such] intent.”87 The author hereof is of the view that 
this statement ought to be interpreted as meaning that SA does not apply the lex 
superior derogate inferiori rule. The status of superiority in regard to which provision 
should apply over the other is, therefore, to be answered by applying ordinary rules of 
statutory interpretation. Although the Glenister minority judgment (in an obiter 
footnote) suggested that an argument can be made that later-enacted legislation 
would generally supersede a previously domesticated international agreement,88 The 
court did not conclude that this prospective argument is correct in law. In fact, the court 
stated that it does not need to “… express a firm view on this issue as it is not before 
us.”89 Furthermore, this argument is assumedly based on the presumption that a DTA 
constitutes lex generalis rather than lex specialis, which according to Vogel is 
incorrect. Since the applicability of a DTA is confined to cross-border taxation of 
residents of the two contracting states, tax treaties constitute special legislation (lex 
specialis). This obiter remark by the court, however, shows that the court was at least 
in agreement that the ordinary rules of legislative interpretation are to be applied in 
order to address conflicting provisions. 
A fundamental point that the author hereof wishes to highlight from the Glenister 
judgment is its reliance on section 233 of the Constitution, which the court held 
“demands any reasonable interpretation that is consistent with international law when 
legislation is interpreted. There is, thus, no escape from the manifest constitutional 
 
84 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) para 178. 
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injunction to integrate, in a way the Constitution permits, international law obligations 
into our domestic law.”90 On this point, it has already been expressed above that DTAs 
(that is, international law) form part of domestic law. Where international law and 
domestic law are in conflict, the Constitution requires these two laws to be interpreted 
in a way that is consistent with international law. Since one of these two conflicting 
laws also constitutes international law, the reconciliation of the two conflicting laws 
will, therefore, need to be done in a manner that does not undermine international law. 
The above-mentioned quote from the Glenister judgment, it is respectfully submitted, 
could arguably, therefore, be interpreted as further support of the lex specialis nature 
of DTAs. 
The South African High Court has also had to pronounce on the status of DTAs in 
the Van Kets matter. In this case, the court reaffirmed the view in the Glenister 
judgment that an international agreement (such as a DTA) is of equal status to 
domestic legislation. On this basis, the court stated that the ordinary rules of statutory 
interpretation to resolve conflicting legislation required one to read the conflicting 
provisions as one coherent whole.91  
Gutuza submits that the court reconciled the purposes of the DTA and the domestic 
law by “indicating that a narrow interpretation of the term 'taxpayer' would result in 
non-compliance with [the DTA] whereas a wider interpretation would render the 
provisions of the Income Tax Act compatible with the obligations of the [DTA].”92  
There are at least two fundamental differences between the Van Kets and 
Tradehold cases that should be highlighted. Firstly, In Van Kets, the applicable 
provision in the DTA pertained to a revenue authority’s information gathering and 
sharing powers, whereas the applicable provision in the DTA in the Tradehold case 
dealt with the allocation of taxing rights. This distinction is, in the author’s view, vital 
because DTAs are entered into for more than one purpose and the purpose of a 
provision gives context thereto, which bears weight when interpreting and applying 
such provision.93  
 
90 Para 202. 
91 Commissioner, South African Revenue Service v Van Kets 2012 3 SA 399 (WCC) para 25. 
92 Gutuza (2016) SA Merc LJ 505. 
93 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA); Krok v 
C:SARS 2015 6 SA 317 (SCA); Art 31(1) of the Vienna Convention; A Rust “Article 3(2)” in 





The purpose of the provisions that allocate taxing rights is to avoid juridical double 
taxation, while the purpose of provisions that enable the sharing of taxpayer 
information is intended to enable foreign tax authorities to perform their tax 
administrative functions. Considering the former purpose, it seems logical for a 
“winner-takes-all” approach to apply. It is difficult to fathom how any other approach 
would practically achieve the purpose of the tax allocation provisions (that is; to 
prevent juridical double taxation). 
Gutuza notes that two camps exist when dealing with conflict between DTAs and 
domestic laws, being a “winner-takes-all” approach (which is where one provision 
trumps the other) and a reconciliatory approach (which is where the provisions are 
reconciled).94 It must be borne in mind that non-compliance with DTAs may result in 
adverse consequences for the reneging contracting state. Considering this, together 
with the above-mentioned purpose of DTA provisions, it seems that the decision as to 
whether to apply a “winner-takes-all” or reconciliatory approach depends on whether 
such approach would enable the DTA provision in question to achieve its purpose. A 
“winner-takes-all” approach to dealing with conflict between provisions of DTAs that 
allocate taxing rights and domestic law arguably enables the DTA to fulfil its purpose 
of avoiding double taxation. On the other hand, a reconciliation approach may well be 
appropriate for DTA provisions with other purposes, such as improving the 
administrative functioning of revenue authorities. The second fundamental difference 
between the Van Kets and Tradehold cases is that, in Van Kets, the applicability of 
the relevant provision in the DTA was limited by the applicable domestic law. This was 
not the case in Tradehold. In fact, the position was arguably inverted in Tradehold in 
the sense that the DTA limited the taxing rights of SA’s domestic law. Considering the 
fact that SA may be subject to adverse consequences if it does not comply with its 
international obligations, this distinction seems material when analysing the 
approaches applied by the courts when addressing the conflict between the provisions 
contained in the DTA and the domestic law. It is arguable that this distinction, together 
with the purpose of the DTA provision in question, will be fundamental when 
determining how to address a conflict between a DTA and domestic law. Where the 
purpose of the DTA provision will be undermined due to domestic law limiting the 
applicability of the DTAs provision, then one must first attempt to apply the principles 
 





in Van Kets by reconciling the two conflicting provisions. On the other hand, it seems 
justified to conclude that the purpose of the tax allocation provisions in the DTA 
requires one to consider such provisions to be lex specialis in nature and thereby 
applying a “winner-takes-all” approach to conflicts between such DTA provisions and 
domestic law.  
The Glenister and the Van Kets judgments could perhaps, in this author’s view, be 
reconciled with that of Tradehold to a limited extent. As per the Glenister decision, 
international agreements that have been domesticated obtain the same legal status 
as other domestic legislation. Perhaps one can interpret the Tradehold judgment as 
merely clarifying the special nature of DTAs, which according to the ordinary rules of 
legislative interpretation (in particular the maxim generalia specialibus non 
derogant),95 generally result in DTAs applying in preference to domestic legislation to 
the extent that they conflict. This particular maxim may only be rebutted by a clear 
expression of intent in the later general Act.96 The general common law principles on 
statutory interpretation appear to support this view. That is, legislation which is 
irreconcilable with a preceding law of equal hierarchy revokes that preceding law.97 
Where, however, the subsequent legislation addresses a matter generally, prior 
conflicting legislation that addresses a matter specifically will be preserved in 
pursuance of the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant.98 This general rule is to 
be applied with caution, given that it is presumed that a statutory provision does not 
purport to change existing laws more than necessary.   
Of course, this argument would not be consistent with the obiter argument raised in 
a footnote by the Glenister minority judgment, however, as explained above the court 
never endorsed this view and therefore did no more than highlight this as a possible 
argument that could be made. 
 
 
95 Later general legislation does not overrule earlier special legislation. 
96 Gutuza (2016) SA Merc LJ 482. 
97 Chotabhai v Union Government (Minister of Justice) & Registrar of Asiatics 1911 AD 13; 
New Modderfontein Gold Mining Co v Tvl Provincial Administration 1919 AD 367 397; R v 
Sutherland 1961 2 SA 806 (A) 815B. 






2.4 Giving legal effect to a DTA – comparative analysis 
2.4.1 United States 
2.4.1.1 Giving legal effect to a DTA in the United States 
The Constitution of the United States99 provides that, as with the Constitution and 
federal laws, treaties constitute the supreme law of the land. 100  DTAs therefore 
automatically obtain equal status with domestic laws. Implementing legislation is 
generally therefore not required.101  
The Senate Finance Committee appears to have acknowledged that DTAs are self-
executing.102 This issue, therefore, seems trite and does not require further analysis.  
 
2.4.1.2 Addressing conflict between a DTA and domestic law  
As mentioned above, the US Constitution103 essentially provides that DTAs are 
equal in standing to domestic legislation. The courts, therefore, use ordinary rules of 
interpretation to address conflicts.104  
According to the court in Whitney v. Robertson,105 the last in time rule is to be 
adopted when addressing a conflict between a DTA and domestic law. In other words, 
whichever was enacted most recently is to be preferred. Academics further supported 
this view,106 which was later codified into domestic legislation.107 
 
99 Constitution of the United States of America (Amend XXVII) (“US Constitution”). 
100 Article VI, cl 2. 
101 Vogel (1986) International Tax & Business Lawyer 20. 
102 S Rep No 110-17, at 7 (2008) (consenting to the Tax Convention with Iceland subject to 
the declaration that the Convention is self-executing). In Y Iwasawa “The doctrine of self-
executing treaties in the United States: A critical analysis” (1985-1986) 26 VA J Int’l L 626 it is 
expressed that “a treaty is self-executing when it can be directly applied by courts or executive 
agencies without the need of further measures.” Further measures would generally include 
the implementation of legislation that provides for the domestic enforceability of the DTA in 
question. 
103 Article VI, cl 2 of the US Constitution. 
104 Whitney v Robertson 124 US 190 (1888). 
105 124 US 190 (1888). 
106 Vogel (1986) International Tax & Business Lawyer 20; AC Infanti “United States” in G 
Maisto (ed) Tax treaties and domestic law: Volume 2 in EC and international tax law series 
(2006) 356. 





Although treaty override is possible, the United States applies a so-called 
“presumption of harmony,” which means that it is assumed that the legislator did not 
intend to override an existing DTA.108 Courts will, therefore, endeavour to interpret the 
DTA and the conflicting domestic legislation that deals with the same subject as one 
coherent whole.109 Nevertheless, a later-enacted domestic provision will override an 
existing conflicting DTA to the extent that they cannot be interpreted as one coherent 
whole.110 
 It is worth noting that the United States Senate published a Report, 111  which 
provides inter alia the following: 
 
“[T]he committee finds it disturbing that some assert that a treaty prevails over later enacted 
conflicting legislation in the absence of an explicit statement of congressional intent to 
override the treaty; that it is treaties, not legislation, which will prevail in the event of a 
conflict absent an explicit and specific legislative override. The committee does not believe 
this view has any foundation in present law.”112 
 
Although not law, this Report appears to clearly indicate that the United States does 
not apply the lex specialis doctrine to DTAs. 
 
 
108 Infanti “United States” in Tax Treaties and Domestic Law 370. 
109 4 Posadas v National City Bank 296 US 497, 503 (1936). 
110  RS Avi-Yonah “Tax Treaty Overrides: A qualified Defence of U.S. Practice” in Tax Treaties 
and Domestic Law 70. 
111 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs Tax Treaty Override (1989); Senate Report 100-445, 
100th Cong., 2nd Sess., Tit. I, XII H 1 (Relationship with Treaties), explaining Sec. 112 (aa) 
of S. 2238 (IRC Sec. 7852) (the “Senate Report”). 





2.4.2 United Kingdom 
2.4.2.1 Giving legal effect to a double taxation agreement in the United Kingdom 
Academics have confirmed that DTAs have no effect in the UK domestic law until 
domesticated by incorporating the DTA into domestic law in accordance with a 
domesticating act.113 A DTA is domesticated in the UK by virtue of section 2 of the 
Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act of 2010 (”TIOPA”), which provides 
the following:114 
 
“S2 (1) Giving effect to arrangements made in relation to other territories 
(1) If Her Majesty by Order in Council declares— 
(a) that arrangements specified in the Order have been made in relation to any territory 
outside the United Kingdom with a view to affording relief from double taxation in relation 
to taxes within subsection (3), and 
(b) that it is expedient that those arrangements should have effect, those arrangements 
have effect. 
(2) If arrangements have effect under subsection (1), they have effect in accordance with 
section 6.” 
 
Section 6 of TIOPA also needs to be taken into consideration. It provides that 
“double taxation arrangements have effect … so far as the arrangements provide [for 
certain listed objects and purposes].”115 Academics have concluded that the phrase 
“so far as” indicates that section 6 restricts the applicability of a DTA.116 Furthermore, 
academics have also suggested that “parliamentary sovereignty enables subsequent 
domestic legislation […] to override the effect of [DTAs].”117 
Parliament is free to accept or reject a draft order in council. From this, it follows 
 
113  K Vogel “The domestic law perspective” in Tax treaties and domestic law EC and 
international tax law series (2006) 4; Vogel (1986) International Tax & Business Lawyer 20. 
See also International Fiscal Association (“IFA”) Cahiers Volume 101B: The notion of tax and 
the elimination of international double taxation or double non-taxation (2016) 862. 
114  R Langston “Back to basics: Double tax treaties” (18-04-2012) The Tax Journal 
<https://www.taxjournal.com/articles/double-tax-treaties-44911> (accessed 18-04-2020). 
115 Section 6 of TIOPA. 
116 See also IFA Cahiers Volume 101B 862, referring to J Schwarz Schwarz on tax treaties 
(2013) 27. 






that it is this legislative act and not the treaty itself that changes existing tax law.118 
 
2.4.2.2 Addressing conflict between a double taxation agreement and domestic 
law 
Roxan has previously stated that “since a treaty only has effect by virtue of the 
authority of a statute, it can have no greater authority in UK domestic law than the 
statute incorporating it provides.”119 Some academics, therefore, appear to be of the 
view that a DTA is of the same status as UK domestic legislation.  
The sovereignty of Parliament is a fundamental principle in the UK. 120  Baker 
suggests that this enables Parliament to implement subsequent domestic legislation 
to override the effect of an existing DTA.121 Roxan, however, submits that the status 
of this principle has been altered by the imposition of the law of the European 
Communities Act of 1972, which is considered to have limited the sovereignty of 
Parliament principle.122 
According to Her Majesty's Revenue and Custom’s (“HMRC’s”) international 
manual, a DTA “takes precedence over domestic legislation … insofar as they provide 
relief from double taxation.”123 HMRC seem to rely on the wording of the domesticating 
legislation as justification for this interpretation, which provides that a DTA will have 
legal effect “despite anything in any enactment.” The specific wording of the UK’s 
domesticating legislation also appears to provide that rules deriving from DTAs 
generally prevail over rules derived from another source. It must be emphasised that 
it is the content of the domesticating legislation in this particular instance, rather than 




118 IFA Cahiers Volume 101B 862. 
119 I Roxan “United Kingdom” in G Maisto (ed) Tax treaties and domestic law (2006) 313-333, 
319. 
120 314. 
121 Baker Double taxation conventions F-7. 
122 Roxan “United Kingdom” in Tax treaties and domestic law 315. 
123 HMRC “INTM267626: Foreign banks trading in the UK through permanent establishments: 








2.4.3.1 Giving legal effect to a double taxation agreement in India 
India applies the dualist approach for the implementation of international law at 
domestic level.124 Domestic law and international law are therefore treated as two 
separate legal systems. This means that international treaties do not automatically 
become part of Indian domestic law. DTAs can therefore only be enforced domestically 
once such DTA in question has been incorporated into domestic law.125 
Article 253 of the Indian Constitution allows parliament to domesticate DTAs. Article 
253 provides that parliament may implement “any treaty, agreement or convention 
with any other country or countries or any decision made at any international 
conference, association or other body.” More specifically, section 90 of the Income 
Tax Act 43 of 1961 allows for the Indian Government to enter into DTAs with other 
states. 
 
2.4.3.2 Addressing conflict between a double taxation agreement and domestic 
law  
Circulars126 issued by The Central Board of Direct Taxes, which forms part of India’s 
Department of Revenue in the Ministry of Finance, appears to have clarified that DTAs 
override Indian domestic law.127  Most notably, circular 789 clarified that where a 
 
124 Jolly Jeorge Verghese & Anr v The Bank of Cochin AIR 1980 SC 470. 
125 SK Agarwal “Implementation of international law in India: Role of judiciary” (14-06-2010) 
SSRN <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1864489> (accessed 06-09-2010). 
126 Government of India: Income Tax Department “Circular No. 789 Clarification regarding 
taxation of income from dividends and capital gains under the Indo-Mauritius Double Tax 
Avoidance Convention (DTAC)” (13-04-2000) Government of India 
<https://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/Communications/Circular/910110000000000483.htm> 
(accessed 04-01-2020) and Government of India: Income Tax Department “Circular No. 333 




=&opt=&isdlg=0> (accessed 04-01-2020). 







specific provision is made in the DTA, that provision will prevail over the general 
provisions contained in the Income Tax Act. This seems to indicate that India relies on 
the Lex specialis derogat legi generali rule to address conflict between DTAs and 
domestic laws. 
Additionally, the Indian High Court128 has previously held as follows: 
 
“where there exists a provision to the contrary in the agreement, there is no scope for 
applying the law of any one of the respective contracting states to tax the income and the 
liability to tax has to be worked out in the manner and to the extent permitted or allowed 
under the terms of the agreement.” 
 
In other words, when there is a conflict between a DTA and Indian domestic law, 
the DTA is considered to override the Indian domestic legislation. The Supreme Court 
of India has also confirmed this point when it previously had to consider, in the case 
of CIT v. Torquoise Investment and Finance Ltd,129 whether the provisions of a DTA 
override the Indian domestic tax law. The judgment, in this case, appears to validate 
the conclusion that a DTA will override the Indian domestic legislation if the domestic 
laws are inconsistent with the DTA.  
 
2.5 Conclusion  
From the above analysis, two approaches to incorporating a treaty into law appear 
to exist. First, in states such as the United States, DTAs are self-executing. This 
means that once entered into, a DTA creates rights and liabilities for taxpayers. The 
second method of incorporating a DTA into domestic law is to utilise enabling 
legislation, as is done in SA, India and the UK. In terms of this method, a DTA has no 
legal effect within a state until it has been incorporated into domestic law. 
After having analysed the prevailing legislation, Commentary and case law from 
SA, the United States, the UK and India, it appears that two general methods to 
address conflict between DTAs and domestic legislation exist. The first being that a 
state can provide for rules that provide that one rule prevails over another (the lex 
surerior derogate inferiori rule), such as in the UK.  
 
128 CIT v VR.S.R.M. Firm 208 ITR 400. 





The second general method identified in this analysis is the ordinary principles of 
legislative interpretation, particularly the lex specialis derogat legi generali rule (such 
as in SA and India). 
Although the United States utilises domestic legislation to address conflicts 
between DTAs and domestic legislation, the content of that legislation stems from 
ordinary principles of legislative interpretation. Unlike SA and India, however, the 
United States does not apply the lex specialis rule. Instead, the United States applies 
the posterior derogate priori rule. Later-enacted domestic legislation can, therefore, 
supersede existing DTAs in the United States. 
The United States is therefore different from SA, India and the UK in the sense that 
the United States does not give preference to a DTA over domestic legislation per se. 
Instead, the United States enforces the later-enacted provision, albeit from a DTA or 
domestic legislation. 
Due to the ability of DTAs to restrict the applicability of domestic laws, consensus 
is needed amongst all states regarding the interpretation of the terms in DTAs (such 
as the phrase “participat[ion] … in the management, control or capital”). In the absence 
thereof, the risk of economic double taxation arises (which would derive from a 
corresponding state being entitled to deny a taxpayer the right to a corresponding 
transfer pricing adjustment due to such state disagreeing with the primary adjustment 






CHAPTER 3: DIFFERING DOMESTIC DEFINITIONS OF THE TERM 
“ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISE” (OR TERMS IN LIEU THEREOF) 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will identify the different relationships that trigger the applicability of 
domestic transfer pricing rules in SA, India, the UK, and the United States. The 
purpose of this discussion is to establish whether there are any differences in the 
domestic triggers of local transfer pricing rules, which may give rise to economic 
double taxation. The different categories, or types of domestic definitions, of 
associated enterprise, will, therefore, be analysed in this chapter.  
This will include, firstly, a concept of associated enterprise that is limited to control 
in the form of shareholding or management or control stemming from a document 
governing a company (such as a memorandum of incorporation), which is applied by 
states such as the UK. Secondly, a definition of associated enterprise that is based on 
an open-ended concept of control, as applied by states such as the USA, will also be 
included. Finally, a definition of associated enterprise that covers a broad 
interpretation of de facto control, as applied by states such as India, will also be 
discussed. The South African definition will be analysed first. 
 
3.2 South Africa 
3.2.1 Domestic trigger for a possible transfer pricing adjustment 
Although the DTAs to which SA is a party refer to an “associated enterprise,” the 
term is not expressly defined in any South African legislation. Section 31, read with 
section 1, of the South African Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (“Income Tax Act”) is the 
primary legislation that regulates transfer pricing amongst associated enterprises. 
These sections, however, utilise the term “connected person” instead of the phrase 
“associated enterprise.” 
Before one can delve into the definition of what constitutes a connected person, 






3.2.2 The domestic relevance of the term “connected person” 
3.2.2.1 General 
Although the focus of this dissertation is the interpretation of the term “associated 
enterprise”, or a term similar thereto, from a transfer pricing perspective, it must be 
noted that the term “connected person” is utilised by the South African Income Tax 
Act for other purposes as well. These sections generally seem to be of an anti-
avoidance nature. An example of this is found in the Eighth Schedule to the Income 
Tax Act, which makes provisions for so-called “value shifting arrangements”. A value 
shifting arrangement is defined in paragraph 1 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act as 
the following: 
 
“An arrangement by which a person retains an interest in a company, trust or partnership, 
but the market value of that person’s interest decreases following a change in the fights or 
entitlements of the interests in the company, trust or partnership, while the value of that 
person’s connected person’s direct or indirect interest in it increases, or his connected 
person acquires a direct or indirect interest in it.” 
 
3.2.2.2 The relevance of the term “connected person” concerning transfer 
pricing 
Subsection (2) of section 31, which effectively provides for the arm’s length 
principle, reads as follows: 
 
“(2)  where –  
(a) any transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding constitutes an 
affected transaction; and 
(b)  any term or condition of that transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or 
understanding – 
(i)  is a term or condition contemplated in paragraph (b) of the definition of 
“affected transaction”; and 
(ii)  results or will result in any tax benefit being derived by a person that is a party 
to that transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding, 
 
the taxable income or tax payable by any person contemplated in paragraph (b)(ii) that 
derives a tax benefit contemplated in that paragraph must be calculated as if that 
transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding had been entered into on the 
terms and conditions that would have existed had those persons been independent 






As is evident from the above, section 31 of the Income Tax Act does not refer to the 
term “connected persons.” The relevance of the phrase “connected persons” lies 
within the phrase “affected transaction,” which is referred to in subsection (2). 
Subsection (2) clearly provides that the arm’s length principle only applies to affected 
transactions, which is defined in subsection (1) as follows: 
 
“(1) For the purposes of this section – 
“affected transaction” means any transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or 
understanding where – 
(a) that transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding has been 
directly or indirectly entered into […] between […] 
 (aa)  a person that is a resident; and  
  (bb)  any other person that is not a resident; 
 … 
and those persons are connected persons in relation to one another; and 
(b) any term or condition of that transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or 
understanding is different from any term or condition that would have existed had 
those persons been independent persons dealing at arm’s length.” [own 
emphasis] 
 
As is illustrated above, if an affected transaction exists as defined by subsection 
(1), then subsection (2) (that is, the provision that effectively provides for the arm’s 
length principle) finds application. In other words, subsection (1) is the door to the 
application of subsection (2) (that is, the arm’s length principle).  
Subsection (1) only applies when there is an international transaction between 
connected persons. There are therefore two legs required to open the door to the 
arm’s length principle; it must be an international transaction and that transaction must 
be between connected parties. If the transaction is not between connected parties, 
then that transaction cannot constitute an affected transaction and, by virtue thereof, 
cannot be subjected to the arm’s length principle.  
Given that the definition of an “affected transaction” uses the words “directly or 
indirectly,” it can be deduced that a transaction may not escape the scope of the 
“affected transaction” definition per se if an independent person has been interposed 






3.2.3 Analysis of the definition of a connected person 
The definition of a connected person as per section 1 of the Income Tax Act 
provides as follows: 
 
“Connected person” means – 
(a) in relation to a natural person – 
(i) any relative; and  
(ii) any trust (other than a portfolio of a collective investment scheme) of which 
such natural person or such relative is a beneficiary; 
 
(b) in relation to a trust (other than a portfolio of a collective investment scheme) – 
(i) any beneficiary of such trust; and  
(ii) any connected person in relation to such beneficiary; 
 
(bA) in relation to a connected person in relation to a trust (other than a portfolio of a 
collective investment scheme), any other person who is a connected person in relation to 
such trust; 
 
(c) in relation to a member of any partnership or foreign partnership –  
(i) any other member; and 
(ii) any connected person in relation to any member of such partnership or foreign 
partnership; 
 
(d) in relation to a company –  
(i) any other company that would be part of the same group of companies as that 
company if the expression ‘at least 70 per cent of the equity shares in’ in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of ‘group of companies’130 in this section 
were replaced by the expression ‘more than 50 per cent of the equity shares or 




130 Section 1 of the Income Tax Act defines a “group of companies” as two or more companies 
in which one company (hereinafter referred to as the “controlling group company”) directly or 
indirectly holds shares in at least one other company (hereinafter referred to as the controlled 
group company), to the extent that –  
(a) at least 70 percent of the equity shares in each controlled group company are directly 
held by the controlling group company, one or more other controlled group companies 
or any combination thereof; and 
(b)  the controlling group company directly holds at least 70 per cent of the equity shares 





(iv) any person, other than a company as defined in section 1 of the Companies 
Act that individually or jointly with any connected person in relation to that 
person, holds, directly or indirectly, at least 20 per cent of –  
(aa) the equity shares in the company; or 
(bb) the voting rights in the company; 
(v) any other company if at least 20 per cent of the equity shares or voting rights 
in the company are held by that other company, and no holder of shares 
holds the majority voting rights in the company; 131  
(vA) any other company if such other company is managed or controlled by –  
(aa) any person who or which is a connected person in relation to such 
company; or 
(bb) any person who or which is a connected person in relation to a person 
contemplated in item (aa); and 
(cc) any other close corporation or company which is a connected person in 
relation to –  
(i) any member contemplated in item (aa); or 
(ii) the relative or trust contemplated in item (bb); and 
(e) in relation to any person who is a connected person in relation to any other person in 
terms of the foregoing provisions of this definition, such other person: 
 
Provided that for the purposes of this definition, a company includes a portfolio of a 
collective investment scheme in securities.” [own emphasis] 
 
Although paragraph (e) only appears at the end of the definition, it is important to 
highlight the effect of paragraph (e) of the definition. Paragraph (e) essentially provides 
that if, for example, X is defined as a connected person in relation to Y, then Y is also 
a connected person in relation to X. In other words, both parties are mutually 
connected persons in relation to each other. So if the definition of a connected person 
in relation to, for example, a company, provides that a natural person with 20% 
shareholding is connected to a company, then that company is mutually also a 
connected person in relation to that natural person by virtue of paragraph (e).132 
 
131 Section 31(4) of The Income Tax Act provides that the phrase “and no holder of shares 
holds the majority voting rights in the company” contained in the definition of connected person 
is to be disregarded for purposes of determining whether a connected person relationship 
exists in respect of the granting of financial assistance, intellectual property or knowledge.  
132  SARS “Interpretation Note 67 (issue 4)” (28-01-2020) SARS  31 
<https://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/Notes/LAPD-IntR-IN-2012-67%20-





It is clear that section 1 provides for distinct definitions of a connected person in 
relation to each different type of person as defined by the Act, as well as in relation to 
a partnership. Although the definition is split into separate paragraphs for all types of 
persons and partnerships, one must still read the definition in its entirety to establish 
all possible connected person relationships. This point is best illustrated by discussing 
the definition of a connected person in relation to natural persons. 
 
3.2.3.1 In relation to a natural person 
One is defined as being connected to a natural person if one is a “relative” of that 
natural person. A relative, according to section 1 of the Income Tax Act, is defined as:  
 
• one’s spouse; 
• anybody related to one within three degrees of consanguinity; 
• the spouse of anybody related to one within three degrees of consanguinity;  
• anybody related to one’s spouse within three  degrees of consanguinity; or 
• the spouse of anybody related to one’s spouse within 3 degrees of 
consanguinity.133 
 
In addition to a relative, a connected person in relation to a natural person also 
includes any trust that the natural person in question, or that natural person’s relative, 
is a beneficiary of.  
Although the definition only lists a relative and certain trusts as constituting 
connected persons in relation to a natural person, these are not the only types of 
persons that can be connected to a natural person, because of paragraph (e) of the 
definition.134 
When one reads paragraph (d)(iv), which states inter alia that any person that holds 
at least 20% equity shares or voting rights in a company is connected to that company, 
together with paragraph (e), the definition provides that a company can also be a 
connected person in relation to a natural person. 
A company can also be regarded as a connected person in relation to a natural 
person by virtue of paragraph (bA), which also has an influence on who can constitute 
 
133 Def of “relative” in s 1 of the Income Tax Act. 





a connected person in relation to a natural person. This paragraph essentially provides 
that all connected persons in relation to a particular trust are also connected persons 
in relation to each other. This means that if a trust and a company are connected by 
virtue of the applicability of paragraph (d)(iv) [that is, the trust holds at least 20% 
shareholding in the company] read with paragraph (e), then all of the beneficiaries of 
that trust will also be regarded as connected persons in relation to that company (and 
vice versa).  
 
3.2.3.2 In relation to a trust 
Paragraph (b) provides that a beneficiary of a trust will constitute a connected 
person in relation to that trust. Secondly, any connected person of that beneficiary135 
will also be a connected person in relation to the trust. Should the beneficiary of the 
trust be a natural person, then any connected person in relation to that natural person 
(as discussed above) will also be connected to the trust. Should the beneficiary be a 
company, then any person connected to that company will also be connected to the 
trust (connected persons in relation to a company is addressed below). 
 
3.2.3.3 In relation to a member of any partnership 
Paragraph (c) provides that a connected person in relation to a partner of a 
partnership is any other partner of the partnership (X), as well as any connected 
persons in relation to X. This paragraph of the definition is relatively straightforward, 
however, the definition of a connected person can get somewhat convoluted and 
stretched when one reads paragraph (c)(ii) together with paragraph (bA), as will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
 
3.2.3.4 In relation to a company 
3.2.3.4.1 Individuals and trusts – (d)(iv)  
An individual or a trust will be regarded as a connected person in relation to a 
company if such individual or trust individually (or jointly with such person’s connected 
 
135 Regarding a beneficiary that is a natural person, see the above paragraph dealing with 





persons) holds, directly or indirectly, at least 20% of the equity shares or voting rights 
in the tested company. 
 
3.2.3.4.2  Companies: Groups – (d)(i) 
The first person to be defined as a connected person in relation to a company is 
any other company that forms part of the same group of companies as defined.136 The 
definition of a group of companies, however, is altered when read with paragraph 
(d)(i).137 A group of companies in this context is therefore defined as two or more 
companies where at least 50% of the equity shares or voting rights in each subsidiary 
company is held directly by the parent company, or held by one or more other 
subsidiary company, or is held in combination by the parent company and its 
subsidiaries. Put differently, “B will be regarded as a connected person in relation to A 
if a controlling group company (that is, a parent company) holds more than 50% of the 
equity share capital of each A and B.”138 A and B will also be connected.139 
The wording of the definition of a group of companies seems to indicate that one 
must add the shares and voting rights held by the parent company and the subsidiary 
companies to determine whether or not the 50% threshold is met. Such an 
interpretation is consistent with the SARS Interpretation Note 67 (issue 4), which 
provides that “the calculation is not based on the determination of an effective 
percentage interest.”140 For example, consider a hypothetical set of facts where a 
parent company holds 66.67% equity and voting rights in a subsidiary company. If the 
 
136 Section 1 of the Income Tax Act defines a “group of companies” as “two or more companies 
in which one company (the ‘controlling group company’) directly or indirectly holds shares in 
at least one other company (the ‘controlled group company’), to the extent that – 
(a) at least 70 percent of the equity shares in each controlled group company are directly 
held by the controlling group company, one or more other controlled group companies 
or any combination thereof; and 
(b) the controlling group company directly holds at least 70 percent of the equity shares in 
at least one controlled group company;” 
137  The phrase “at least 70 percent of the equity shares” in the definition of “group of 
companies” is to be repealed and replaced by the phrase “more than 50 percent of the equity 
share or voting rights”. 
138 De Koker & Williams Silke 1.18. 
139 1.18. 





parent company directly holds 25% in company X and the subsidiary company directly 
holds 30% in company X, then in terms of subsection (d)(i) of the connected person 
definition, company X will constitute a connected person by virtue of forming part of 
the parent company and subsidiary company’s group of companies. This is because 
the parent and subsidiary company together hold 55% in company X, which exceeds 
the threshold of the “group of companies” definition for purposes of the “connected 
person” definition. The fact that the parent company directly holds 45% shareholding 
in company X is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether company X is a group 
company for purposes of establishing whether the connected person definition has 
been triggered. 
 
3. 2. 3. 4. 3  Equity shares – (d)(v) 
Paragraph (d)(v) also defines a company as a connected person in relation to any 
other company that holds at least 20% of the equity shares141 or voting rights in the 
tested company and no holder of shares holds the majority voting rights in the 
company.142 One of the two most pertinent issues to note on this point is that section 
31 of the Income Tax Act provides that, for the purposes of section 31, the wording 
underlined above, which appears in paragraph (d)(v) of the definition of a connected 
person, is to be disregarded where the tested transaction consists of the granting of 
financial assistance or intellectual property as defined in section 23I(1), or 
knowledge.143 The second point to note is that in determining the 20% threshold, only 
direct shareholding is to be considered.144 
 
141 Section 1 defines an equity share as any share in a company, excluding any share that, 
neither as respects dividends nor as respects return of capital, carries any right to participate 
beyond a specified amount in a distribution. Put differently, as long as a shareholder’s right to 
participate in dividend or capital distributions, the share will constitute an equity share. 
142 Section 31(4) of the Income Tax Act provides that the phrase “and no holder of shares 
holds the majority voting rights in the company” contained in the definition of connected person 
is to be disregarded for purposes of determining whether a connected person relationship 
exists in respect of the granting of financial assistance, intellectual property or knowledge. 
143 According to page 34 of the SARS Explanatory Memorandum to Taxation Law Amendment 
Bill 2007, the reason for the reduced threshold for the scope of the connected person definition 
in relation to financial assistance or IP transactions is because these transactions have been 
identified as being at higher risk of being used from tax avoidance purposes. 





3.2.3.4.4 Companies: Managed or controlled – (d)(vA) 
Additionally, subparagraph (vA)(aa) provides that a company (“Y”) is a connected 
person in relation to another company (“X”) if Y is managed or controlled by a 
connected person in relation to X. Company Y is therefore connected to company X if 
company Y is managed or controlled by:  
 
• a “holder” (that is; individual or trust) with 20% shareholding in company X; 
• a trust if company X is a trust beneficiary; 
• any connected person in relation to a trust that company X is also connected to;  
• a group company in relation to company X; or 
• another company with 20% shareholding in company X to the extent that no other 
holder of shares holds the majority voting rights in company X. 
 
Lastly, subparagraph (vA)(bb) provides that company Y is a connected person in 
relation to company X if a connected person in relation to company X’s connected 
person manages or controls company Y. This subparagraph can be put in the following 
simple terms: 
 
“X is a connected person in relation to Company A 
Y manages or controls Company B 
Y is a connected person in relation to X 
Company B is therefore a connected person in relation to Company A”145 
 
This subparagraph extends the connected person net to companies that are 
managed or controlled by persons that are connected to each other. For example, two 
relatives (X and Y) are the sole shareholders and directors of their own respective 
companies (A and B). According to subparagraph (vA)(bb), A and B are connected 
persons in relation to each other.  
 
 





3. 2. 3. 4. 5  The meaning of “managed or controlled” 
In ITC 1741,146 the court considered the meaning of “connected person” as per 
section 12C(6)(a)(i) of the Income Tax Act as it was at that time. The definition 
provided that “a connected person in relation to a company includes any other 
company if both such companies are controlled or owned directly or indirectly by the 
same persons.”147 
Although not exactly the same as the current definition, the current definition also 
refers to a connected person in relation to a company as being another company that 
is controlled by a connected person of that first-mentioned company. Although the 
old definition of a connected person has since been amended, I am of the view that 
the term “controlled” was used in the same context as the current definition of a 
connected person (being that the action of control was indicative of a connected 
person relationship). Therefore, it is submitted that any judgments dealing with the 
meaning of the term “controlled” as per the old definition of a connected person are 
still of relevance today. 
In ITC 1741, company X and company Y were not commonly owned. The only 
question that the court was therefore left to consider was whether the same persons 
controlled X and Y. In this matter, each company had its own board of directors. 
Despite company X and company Y having their own respective boards, in substance 
control of company X was exercised by company X’s board of directors (with the 
exclusion of Mr C who, despite being a director, did not have any power). On the other 
hand, although the board of directors of company Y had the legal ability to control 
company Y, it was not, in fact, controlling the company. “Mr C was a domineering 
presence who effectively made all the decisions and informed everyone afterwards. 
He controlled the company (that is; company Y) and the input from fellow directors, if 
any, was limited to that of a consulting nature.”148 
After considering the case of S v Pouroulis,149 the court came to the conclusion that, 
in the absence of a statutory definition of “control” (or any other contradictory 
indicators), the ordinary meaning is to be ascribed to the term “control”. On this point, 
 
146 65 SATC 106. 
147 As the sections read in 1992. 
148 SARS “Interpretation Note 67 (issue 4)” (28-01-2020) SARS 32. 





the court concluded that control refers to de facto control, in other words, factual 
control rather than some form of control in the legal sense. One must, therefore, 
establish how the entity in question is controlled, as well as how this method of control 
is effectively exercised.150 In practice, the business and affairs of a company must be 
managed by or under the direction of its board.151 However, establishing who has de 
facto control of an entity will need to be decided on a case by case basis, based on 
the relevant facts. 
As mentioned earlier, in ITC 1741 the court held that, despite company Y having its 
own board of directors that were able to control the company, Mr C was effectively in 
control of company Y since Mr C made all the decisions and informed the board 
thereafter.152 From this case, it can be deduced that effective control will give rise to a 
de facto control relationship, regardless of whether or not the person exercising 
effective control has control in the legal sense. Put differently, where a person has 
carte blanche to run a company, the company will be de facto controlled by that 
person.153 
For example, a CEO of two different companies may not have control over the two 
different companies in a legal sense, given that the CEO holds less than a controlling 
share of equity or voting rights in both companies, and is not the sole board member 
of the companies. Nevertheless, if the CEO is a domineering presence that effectively 
makes all the decisions of both companies, then such CEO will be in de facto control 
over both companies.  
Considering the broad scope of de facto control, it seems more likely than not that 
any minority shareholder may even potentially be the person that effectively makes all 
the decisions of the company, thereby resulting in that company being de facto 
controlled by that particular minority shareholder (regardless of whether the 
quantitative threshold of 20% for individuals or 50% for group companies, in equity 
shares or voting rights is met). An example of how a minority shareholder may exercise 
de facto control is if that shareholder has the majority voting rights at a specific 
 
150 ITC 1054 26 SATC 260 263, Estate Kootcher v CIR 1941 AD 256 301. 
151 Section 66 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
152 SARS “Interpretation Note 67 (issue 4)” (28-01-2020) SARS 29. 





shareholders meeting where certain decisions are made regarding the acquisition or 
disposal of assets, or to incur a liability.  
Some professionals in practice are of the view that control is wide enough to include 
exclusive distribution rights or offtake arrangements. In cases where this is the extent 
of the relationship, it is respectfully submitted that such contracting parties cannot 
constitute a connected person by virtue of de facto control. This submission is based 
on the premise that the person entering into an agreement with the company does not 
factually have carte blanche to run the company. Of course, such commercial 
arrangement may influence the persons that run the company, however, that does not 
result in the “influencer” running the company (and thereby being in de facto control 
thereof). The person who runs the company cannot be said to have relinquished itself 
from running the company and having given the “influencer” carte blanche to run the 
company. The company’s actions remain the result of the actions of the person who 
runs the company, not the person who influences that person who runs the company. 
The same can be said about creditors of a company; they may influence the person 
who runs the company by way of contractual rights entitling the lender to restrict the 
decisions of the borrower, but that does not per se give rise to the creditor running the 
company. Academics have also opined that mere economic dominance or 
dependence deriving from commercial relationships originating from de facto 
situations should not be confused with control.154  
On the other hand, where a company gives an independent creditor (by way of an 
amendment to the document regulating that borrowing company)155 the power to veto 
any decisions pertaining to the company’s capital expenditure or acquisitions, the 
incurral of further debt or any other material arrangement, it could be argued that such 
powers conferred upon the creditor in terms of the document regulating that borrowing 
company gives rise to a de facto controlling relationship in the narrow sense.  
 
Although the SARS’ interpretation note discusses the term “managed” separately 
to the term “controlled”, and states that the term “managed” is very broad, the 
 
154 Dwarkasing Associated Enterprises 237. 
155 The question whether amending the document regulating that borrowing company to 
cater for the lender in such manner is a question of company law, which falls outside the 
scope of this dissertation. To the extent that the document regulating that borrowing 
company remains unchanged, and the lender relies on a contractual right instead, then such 





interpretation note gives the impression that the term “managed” also generally 
requires one to look at the board level of the company. The difference between the 
two terms may perhaps be that management is of a lower bar or threshold than control, 
in other words, mere participation in the management functions at board level (rather 
than control at board level) may suffice.  
 
3.2.3.5 In relation to a close corporation (“CC”) 
Subparagraph (d)(vi) contains the definition of a connected person in relation to a 
CC, which has also been divided into three subparagraphs. 
Subparagraph (d)(vi)(aa) provides that a connected person in relation to a CC is 
any member of that CC.  
Subparagraph (bb) is essentially divisible in the sense that it provides for two types 
of parties that are defined as a connected person in relation to a CC. First, it provides 
that any relative of a member is connected to the CC. Second, it provides that any 
trust that is a connected person in relation to a member is connected to the CC. 
Subparagraph (cc) of the definition provides that a connected person in relation to 
a CC also includes any other CC or company that is connected person in relation to a 
member of the CC, or that is connected to a trust which is connected to a member of 
the CC. 
Subparagraph (cc)(ii) is also divisible. The second part of the subsection has been 
discussed above (that is; any CC or company that is a connected person in relation to 
a trust that is connected to a member). The first part provides that any CC or company 
(“Y”) that is a connected person in relation to a relative of a member of the CC (“X”) is 
a connected person in relation to that CC (X). 
Subparagraphs (bb), (cc)(i) and the second part of (cc)(ii) essentially provide that a 
connected person in relation to a member is a connected person to the CC. Although 
these subparagraphs do not provide so entirely because they do not mention partners 
of a partnership, subparagraph (c)(ii) provides that any connected person in relation 
to a partner is connected to any other partner. If one partner is a member of a CC, 
then such CC is connected to that partner. By virtue of this subparagraph, read with 
paragraph (e), a CC is connected to a partner of any member from the CC. I, therefore, 
submit that it is correct to say that a connected person in relation to a CC includes any 






3.2.3.6 In relation to a connected person of a trust 
Paragraph (bA) to the definition is somewhat unique in the sense that it defines two 
persons as being connected to one another if both persons are connected to a mutual 
trust. This part of the definition appears relatively broad because it seems to cater for 
particular cases where no direct relationship exists between the parties. For example, 
a trust that was formed to benefit Black Economic Empowerment (“BEE”) 
shareholders may have numerous beneficiaries. Two of the beneficiaries (X and Y), 
who are unrelated to one another, are each the sole shareholder of his or her own 
company. According to paragraph (bA), these two companies will be regarded as 
connected persons in relation to each other, which is not generally provided for under 
paragraph (d). This broad paragraph may be seen as giving rise to harsh results in 
cases where X and Y are not acquainted with one another (ie; where X and Y are at 
arm’s length) and their companies begin trading with one another. 
Paragraph (bA) clearly gives rise to a broad definition of the term connected person. 
This is evident if one reads paragraph (c)(ii) together with paragraph (bA), which is 
best illustrated by way of an example: 
 
• A and B are partners of a partnership that provides professional services. This 
means that A and B are connected persons to one another in terms of paragraph 
(c)(i). 
• B is married to C. This means that B and C are connected persons in terms of 
paragraph (a)(i). 
• C is a beneficiary of Trust Y. C and Y are therefore connected in terms of 
paragraph (b)(i), and B and Y are connected in terms of paragraph (b)(ii). 
• Company X is also a beneficiary of Trust Y. X is therefore connected to Y in terms 
of paragraph (b)(i). 
• Trust Y holds 20% of the equity shares and voting rights in Company Z and no 
holder of shares holds the majority voting rights. Y is therefore connected to Z in 
terms of paragraph (d)(v). 







Although such broad definitions may be beneficial when utilised for anti-avoidance 
provisions, it may give rise to detrimental consequences to unknowing parties 
transacting with each other (and unknowing third parties utilising data from such 
transaction for benchmarking purposes) when used for transfer pricing purposes. The 
example above illustrates this point well. If A were to enter into a transaction with X or 
Z, then such transactions would not be considered to be of an arm’s length nature. 
This would mean that the pricing data from such transactions would not be able to be 
utilised as an internal comparable by either party, nor would a third party be able to 
utilise such data for benchmarking purposes, and the transactions would be subject to 
section 31 of the Act, provided that the international element is also present. These 
consequences would arise regardless of whether or not A even knew of Y’s existence 
and of Y’s connection to B, X and Z.  
As is evident from the above, this paragraph creates a considerably wide definition 
of a connected person. On the face of it, it would seem that the connection that gives 
rise to a connected party relationship in terms of this paragraph could be considerably 
extensive. The connections may even be so stretched that one may even question 
whether parties that meet the definition of a connected person in terms of this 
paragraph are not in the substance of an arm’s length to one another. 
 
3.2.3.7 In relation to transactions in respect of the granting of financial 
assistance, intellectual property or knowledge 
Section 31(4) of The Income Tax Act provides that the phrase “and no holder of 
shares holds the majority voting rights in the company” contained in subparagraph 
(d)(v) of the definition of “connected person” is to be disregarded for purposes of 
determining whether a connected person relationship exists in respect of the granting 
of financial assistance, intellectual property or knowledge. One issue that requires 
clarification is whether this reduced threshold for the applicability of the arm’s length 
principle in terms of section 31 of the Income Tax Act will only be in respect of financial 
assistance, intellectual property or granting of knowledge transactions, or whether the 
reduced threshold will apply to all transactions in cases where at least one of the 
transactions pertain to the granting of financial assistance, intellectual property of 
knowledge. Lermer and Van Rhyn have previously stated that “in line with the global 





transfer pricing perspective, the National Treasury and SARS are actively 
endeavouring to discourage ‘abusive’ schemes involving [inter alia] intellectual 
property.”156 Lermer and Van Rhyn go on to conclude that it is for this purpose that the 
scope of the transfer pricing legislation relating to inter alia intellectual property 
transactions was extended.157 Lermer and Van Rhyn state that the extended scope is 
only intended to apply in the context of the transactions that have been identified as 
requiring further discouragement due to such transactions being considered to be 
enabling “abusive” schemes.158 The extension of the scope of section 31 will therefore 
not apply to all a person’s transactions if that person has entered into a transaction 
pertaining to financial assistance, intellectual property or granting of knowledge. The 
scope of section 31 of the Income Tax Act will therefore not be extended to that 
person’s other transactions that do not consist of financial assistance, intellectual 
property or granting of knowledge. 
 
3.2.3.8 Amendment to section 31 
On 15 January 2020, the Tax Law Amendment Act 34 of 2019 was promulgated. 
This Amendment Act amended inter alia the definition of “affected transaction” in 
section 31 of the Income Tax Act. The amendment was initially meant to commence 
on 1 January 2021, however, it has been proposed in the Tax Law Amendment Bill of 
2020 that this date be delayed to 1 January 2022. 
The Amendment Act amended the “affected transaction” definition by substituting 
the phrase “and those persons are connected persons in relation to one another” 
with the phrase “and those persons are connected persons or associated 
enterprises in relation to one another.”159 
 
156 J van Rhyn & D Lermer “Recent transfer pricing developments” (2008) 5 International 
Transfer Pricing Journal 230.  
157 230. 
158 230. 
159 SARS “Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2019” (21-01-








The Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill that ultimately derived into the 
Amendment Act provides the following reason for the inclusion of the term “associated 
enterprises” to the “affected transaction” definition. 
 
“Both the OECD and UN use the concept of “associated enterprises” when applying the 
arm’s length principle, […] On the other hand, South Africa still uses the concept of 
“connected persons” when applying the arm’s length principle. The fact that South Africa 
does not have or use the concept of associated enterprises when applying the arm’s length 
principle presents a challenge in application of the transfer pricing rules in respect of 
transactions between “associated enterprises” that are not regarded connected 
persons.”160 
 
The Explanatory Memorandum goes on to provide that:  
 
“[i]n order to address this anomaly, it is proposed that changes be made in section 31 of 
the Act so that the scope of the transfer pricing rules be extended to also include 
transactions between persons that are not connected persons, but that are “associated 
enterprises” as described in Article 9(1) of the MTC on Income and on Capital of the 
OECD.”161 
 
The fundamental point that needs to be addressed is that the Explanatory 
Memorandum suggests that the term “associated enterprise” is broader than the term 
“connected person”. Given the low shareholding or voting rights threshold of 20% that 
is provided for by the connected person definition, it is argued later in chapter 3.2.4 
read together with chapter 4.6 that it is unlikely that the term “associated enterprise” 
is broader than the term “connected person”. Consequently, it appears that SARS’ 
explanation for the amendment to section 31 of the Income Tax Act is flawed. 
Lastly, SARS explains the reason for the effective date of the amendment being 
delayed until 1 January 2021, stating that “[i]n order to give SARS and taxpayers more 
time to consider the interpretation of the term “associated enterprise”, it is proposed 
that the effective date of this provision be postponed by a year, from 1 January 2020 
 
160 SARS “Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2019” (21-01-
2020) SARS 41. 
161 SARS “Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2019” (21-01-





to 1 January 2021.” 162 It has been proposed in the Tax Law Amendment Bill of 2020 
that this date be delayed until 1 January 2022. 
Based on the discussion above regarding SARS’ flawed reasoning for amending 
section 31 of the Income Tax Act, it appears that SARS is under the erroneous 
impression that the term “associated enterprise” is broader than the term “connected 
person.” Given that the term “associated enterprise” is not broader than the term 
“connected person,”163 the amendment to section 31 of the Income Tax Act will in all 
likelihood have no effect on the scope of the application of the arm’s length principle 
contained in section 31 of the Income Tax Act.  
This amendment will also not mitigate the possibility of economic double taxation 
arising in cases where the non-SA party to the transaction is resident in a contracting 
state that SA does not have a DTA with, because both contracting states will still be 
applying a unilateral approach (which may differ to that taken by the other relevant 
contracting state) to determining the applicability of the arm’s length principle. 
 
3.2.4 Concluding remarks on the South African definition of a connected person 
One can see that, although the definition of a connected person, as per section 1 of 
the Income Tax Act, provides for separate definitions of a connected person in relation 
to each different type of person as defined by the Act (as well as in relation to a 
partnership), the definition should be read as a whole. One would be left with an 
incomplete definition if one were to read only portions of the definition in isolation. For 
example, paragraph (a) does not list a company as a possible connected person in 
relation to a natural person. However, paragraph (d)(iv) read with paragraph (e), do. It 
is therefore crucial that one always reads the definition in its entirety. Another clear 
takeaway that needs to be noted is that a connected person is very widely defined, to 
the point where parties may not even be aware of an existing connected person 
relationship. The implication is that parties may be unaware that they are connected 
parties and that their transactions need to conform with the arm’s length principle. In 
 
162 SARS “Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2019” (21-01-
2020) SARS 42. 
163 The reasons for concluding that the term “associated enterprise” is narrower than the term 
“connected person” is deduced from the analysis of the interpretation of the two terms under 





such instance, however, the parties most likely did transact with each other on an 
arm’s length basis. The more onerous consequence of the broad definition of a 
connected person is the compliance obligations that arise from entering into an 
affected transaction.  
 
3.3 India 
Unlike SA, India does utilise the term “associated enterprise” in its domestic 
legislation.  
 
3.3.1 Domestic trigger for a possible transfer pricing adjustment 
Section 92(1) read with section 92B of the Indian Income Tax Act 43 of 1961 
provides for the trigger of a possible transfer pricing adjustment. Section 92(1) 
provides that “any income arising from an international transaction shall be computed 
having regard to the arm’s length price.” The definition of an international transaction 
is found in section 92B, which provides inter alia that an “international transaction” is 
a transaction between at least two “associated enterprises”. 
When read together, these sections clearly indicate that the term “associated 
enterprise” is utilised to govern the application of transfer pricing legislation. 
 
3.3.2 Domestic definition of associated enterprise 
The domestic definition will be provided below, which will be followed by a brief 
analysis thereof. Section 92A of the Indian Act defines an associated enterprise as 
follows: 
 
“(1) For the purposes of this section and sections 92, 92B, 92C, 92D, 92E and 92F, 
“associated enterprise”, in relation to another enterprise, means an enterprise— 
(a)  which participates, directly or indirectly, or through one or more intermediaries, 
in the management or control or capital of the other enterprise; or 
(b)  in respect of which one or more persons who participate, directly or indirectly, 
or through one or more intermediaries, in its management or control or capital, 
are the same persons who participate, directly or indirectly, or through one or 







(2)  For the purposes of sub-section (1), two enterprises shall be deemed to be associated 
enterprises if, at any time during the previous year,— 
(a)  one enterprise holds, directly or indirectly, shares carrying not less than twenty-
six per cent of the voting power in the other enterprise; or 
(b)  any person or enterprise holds, directly or indirectly, shares carrying not less 
than twenty-six per cent of the voting power in each of such enterprises; or 
(c)  a loan advanced by one enterprise to the other enterprise constitutes not less 
than fifty-one per cent of the book value of the total assets of the other 
enterprise; or 
(d)  one enterprise guarantees not less than ten per cent of the total borrowings of 
the other enterprise; or 
(e)  more than half of the board of directors or members of the governing board, or 
one or more executive directors or executive members of the governing board 
of one enterprise, are appointed by the other enterprise; or 
(f)  more than half of the directors or members of the governing board, or one or 
more of the executive directors or members of the governing board, of each of 
the two enterprises are appointed by the same person or persons; or 
(g)  the manufacture or processing of goods or articles or business carried out by 
one enterprise is wholly dependent on the use of know-how, patents, 
copyrights, trade-marks, licences, franchises or any other business or 
commercial rights of similar nature, or any data, documentation, drawing or 
specification relating to any patent, invention, model, design, secret formula or 
process, of which the other enterprise is the owner or in respect of which the 
other enterprise has exclusive rights; or 
(h)  ninety per cent or more of the raw materials and consumables required for the 
manufacture or processing of goods or articles carried out by one enterprise, 
are supplied by the other enterprise, or by persons specified by the other 
enterprise, and the prices and other conditions relating to the supply are 
influenced by such other enterprise; or 
(i)  the goods or articles manufactured or processed by one enterprise, are sold to 
the other enterprise or to persons specified by the other enterprise, and the 
prices and other conditions relating thereto are influenced by such other 
enterprise; or 
(j)  where one enterprise is controlled by an individual, the other enterprise is also 
controlled by such individual or his relative or jointly by such individual and 
relative of such individual; or  
(k)  where one enterprise is controlled by a Hindu undivided family, the other 
enterprise is controlled by a member of such Hindu undivided family or by a 
relative of a member of such Hindu undivided family or jointly by such member 
and his relative; or 
(l)  where one enterprise is a firm, association of persons or body of individuals, 
the other enterprise holds not less than ten per cent interest in such firm, 





(m)  there exists between the two enterprises, any relationship of mutual interest, as 
may be prescribed.” 
 
Subsection (1) of the definition appears extremely broad as it provides that all 
persons that participate in the control, management, or the capital of a company are 
an associated enterprise in relation to that company. It also expressly provides that 
two entities will be associated with each other in situations where the same person 
participates in both those entities’ capital, management, or control. 
The level of participation in the capital required for an associated enterprise to exist 
is not mentioned in subsection (1). Subsection (2) of the Act, however, seems to 
provide clarity on this point. The relevant portion provides as follows: 
 
“For the purposes of sub-section (1), two enterprises shall be deemed to be associated 
enterprises if, at any time during the previous year, (a) one enterprise holds, directly or 
indirectly, shares carrying not less than twenty-six per cent of the voting power in the other 
enterprise; or (b) any person or enterprise holds, directly or indirectly, shares carrying not 
less than twenty-six per cent of the voting power in each of such enterprises.” 
 
The phrase “for the purpose of subsection (1)” shows that subsection (2) sets the 
parameters, such as degree of participation in capital, or management, which must be 
met in order for an associated enterprise to exist.164 This is also of assistance in giving 
context to what constitutes “control,” since the term is not defined in the Act. 
As regards the level of participation in capital that is required, subsection (a) 
provides that the level of participation in capital required for an associated enterprise 
relationship to exist is 26%. On the other hand, subsection (l) provides that an 
enterprise only needs a 10% interest in a firm in order for that enterprise to constitute 
an associated enterprise in relation to that firm (that is, a partnership).165  
In regards to the degree of participation in management that is required, 
subparagraph (e) indicates that one enterprise is connected to another if more than 
half of the board of directors, or at least one executive director of an enterprise is 
appointed by that first-mentioned enterprise. Furthermore, subparagraph (f) provides 
that two enterprises are associated with one another if a mutual person appoints half 
 
164 CBDT Circular 14 of 2001 – New legislation to curb tax avoidance by abuse of transfer 
pricing – Appendix C. 





of their board of directors or appoints at least one executive director for both 
enterprises. 
 
3.3.3 Domestic relevance of the term “control” 
I am of the view that subsections (c),166 (d),167 (g)168 and (h)169 are indicative of 
dependency. Since subsection (2) is to give context to subsection (1), it seems as 
though the only logical conclusion one can reach, by process of elimination, is that 
subsections (c), (d), (g) and (h) may be contextualising what constitutes control.  
Subsections (j) and (k) essentially provide that two enterprises are associated to 
each other if they are both controlled by the same individual(s), or by the same Hindu 
family share, or one enterprise is controlled by an individual and the other is controlled 
by that individual’s relative. These two subsections also certainly belong to the 
“control” category. It is unfortunate, however, that they do not give context to what 
constitutes “control”. 
Subsection (m) provides that two enterprises are associated with one another if any 
relationship of mutual interest, as may be prescribed, exists between them. I am of the 
view that subsection (m) can only be regarded as a “catch-all” subsection, which does 
not give context to management, control or the necessary participation in capital 
needed to trigger an associated enterprise.  
Additionally, subsection (i)170 also does not appear to contextualise management, 
control, or the level of participation in capital required for an associated enterprise 
 
166 Subsection (c) provides that an enterprise is associated to another if that first-mentioned 
enterprise extends a loan of at least 51 per cent of the other enterprise’s book value. 
167 Subsection (d) provides that two enterprises are associated to each other if one enterprise 
guarantees at least 10 per cent of the other enterprise’s total borrowings. 
168  Subsection (g) provides that two enterprises are associated to each other if the 
manufacture of goods carried out by one enterprise is wholly dependent on the IP of the other 
enterprise.  
169 Subsection (h) provides that two enterprises are associated to each other if at least 90 per 
cent of the materials required for the manufacture of goods by one enterprise are supplied by 
the other enterprise. 
170 Subsection (i) provides that two enterprises are associated to each other if the goods or 
articles manufactured or processed by one enterprise, are sold to the other enterprise or to 
persons specified by the other enterprise, and the prices and other conditions relating thereto 





relationship to exist. It may therefore arguably also be considered an additional “catch-
all” subsection. 
 
3.3.4 Comparative analysis in relation to South Africa 
The first difference one notices is that, unlike SA, India does not divide the definition 
in such a way that it defines an associated person in relation to different types of legal 
persons (including partnerships). 
One of the most notable differences between the Indian definition of an associated 
enterprise and SA’s definition of a connected person is that SA’s definition does not 
contain provisions similar to India’s “dependency” provisions (which could arguably fall 
within the ambit of “influencers” as referred to in the South African section of this 
chapter). 
The two most important differences that need to be highlighted are, firstly, that the 
level of participation required by a company in India (that is, 26%) is less than what is 
required for a connected person relationship to exist in SA (that is, more than 50%, to 
the extent that the arrangement does not pertain to financial assistance or IP).171 
Secondly, India includes certain forms of de facto control in the broad sense172 in their 
definition, while SA arguably interprets “control” as de facto control in the narrow 
sense. 
 
3.4 United Kingdom  
As is the case with SA, the UK does not utilise the term “associated enterprise” in 
its domestic legislation. Instead, the UK’s primary transfer pricing legislation requires 




171 An exception to this “more than 50 percent” participation requirement would be instances 
where no holder of shares holds the majority voting rights. In such instance, the “more than 
50 percent” participation requirement is reduced to 20%. 
172 Reference to de facto control in the broad sense is a misnomer in the sense that it does 
not refer to real control. Instead, it refers to mere economic dominance or dependence deriving 
from commercial relationships originating from de facto situations. For the sake of brevity, this 





3.4.1 Trigger for the applicability of transfer pricing adjustment 
Section 147(3) and (5) of the Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act of 
2010 (“TIOPA”) are the domestic subsections that provide for the applicability of the 
arm’s length principle. In other words, these provisions provide that the profits and/or 
losses of the contracting parties are to be calculated for tax purposes as if the contract 
was entered into at an arm’s length. 
Subsections (2) and (4) provide the requirements for the applicability of subsections 
(3) and (5), which are twofold. First, the “basic pre-condition” must be met. Second, 
the transaction must give rise to a potential UK tax advantage. 
The definition of the “basic pre-condition” is found in subsection (1), which is defined 
as follows: 
 
“(a) provision (“the actual provision”) has been made or imposed as between any two 
persons (“the affected persons”) by means of a transaction or series of transactions, 
(b) the participation condition is met (see section 148), 
(c) the actual provision is not within subsection (7) (oil transactions), and  
(d) the actual provision differs from the provision (“the arm’s length provision”) which 
would have been made as between independent enterprises.” 
 
It appears that the term is somewhat of a misnomer in the sense that there are four 
pre-conditions (not merely one pre-condition). The most important of which, for 
purposes of this study, is the “participation condition”. This is because if this condition 
is not met then it is meaningless to examine whether or not the pre-conditions of (a) 
and (d) were met. In other words, meeting the participation condition is the essential 
trigger that can cause the domino effect of opening the door to the arm’s length 
principle (that is; subsections (3) and (5)) via their respective triggers (that is; 
subsections (2) and (4)).  
 
3.4.2 Definition of “participation condition” 
Section 148 of TIOPA defines the participation condition as follows: 
 
“(1) For the purposes of section 147(1)(b), the participation condition is met if— 
(a) condition A is met in relation to the actual provision so far as the actual 
provision is provision relating to financing arrangements, and 
(b) condition B is met in relation to the actual provision so far as the actual 





(2) Condition A is that, at the time of the making or imposition of the actual provision or 
within the period of six months beginning with the day on which the actual provision 
was made or imposed— 
(a) one of the affected persons was directly or indirectly participating in the 
management, control or capital of the other, or 
(b) the same person or persons was or were directly or indirectly participating in 
the management, control or capital of each of the affected persons. 
(3) Condition B is that, at the time of the making or imposition of the actual provision— 
(a) one of the affected persons was directly or indirectly participating in the 
management, control or capital of the other, or 
(b) the same person or persons was or were directly or indirectly participating in 
the management, control or capital of each of the affected persons. 
(4) In this section “financing arrangements” means arrangements made for providing or 
guaranteeing, or otherwise in connection with, any debt, capital or other form of 
finance. 
(5) For the interpretation of subsections (2) and (3) see sections 157 to 163.” 
 
3.4.2.1 Analysis of section 148 (the participation condition) 
One can see that section 148 is divided into two parts. One part caters for “financial 
arrangements”, and the other part caters for arrangements that are not financial 
arrangements (“general arrangements”). The condition that needs to be met in order 
for the participation condition to be met for both arrangements is relatively similar,173 
which is that “one of the affected persons was directly or indirectly participating in the 
management, control or capital of the other,”174 or a mutual person(s) directly or 
indirectly participated in the management, control or capital of both affected 
persons.175 The participation condition and the OECD MTC definition of an associated 
enterprise appear very similar, which may ultimately mean that one may be able to 
glean from the definition of the participating condition in order to gain insight into 
interpreting the OECD MTC definition of an associated enterprise.176 
 
 
173 The only material difference is that the condition must be met at the time of the provision 
being entered into when pertaining to general arrangements, whereas the condition can be 
met at any time within 6 months of the provision being entered into when pertaining to financial 
arrangements.  
174 Sections 148(2)(a) and 148(3)(a) of the TIOPA. 
175 Section 148(2)(b) and 148(3)(b). 
176 See chapter 4 of this dissertation for further details on interpreting the OECD MTC definition 






The “participation condition” definition refers to “provisions,” which is undefined. 
According to HMRC’s Commentary, 177  the term is synonymous to the phrase 
“conditions made or imposed”, as can be found in Article 9 of the OECD MTC. HMRC’s 
Commentary emphasises that such an interpretation is consistent with the entirety of 
the Act, which requires this part of the Act to be interpreted following OECD 
principles.178 
 
3.4.3.1 Provisions between affected persons in cases where an independent 
party is interposed in the transaction 
It appears that the provision does not necessarily have to be entered into directly 
with the affected persons that are under common control in order for the transaction 
to fall within the scope of the participation condition. Further guidance on this point 
can be found in the case of DSG Retail Ltd v HMRC,179 which dealt with reinsurance 
arrangements for extended warranties on household electronic goods. The DSG 
Group would utilise its UK resident group entities (“the UK group entities”) to sell 
extended warranties to customers in the UK. The UK group entities would then obtain 
insurance cover on the extended warranties, which would be covered by an 
independent third party (“ASL”). ASL would then reinsure the risk on those extended 
warranties with another entity that was part of the DSG Group (“DISL”), which was a 
resident of the Isle of Man.  
Although there were no transactions that took place directly between the associated 
entities, “the various entities knew that the different agreements would all take effect 
together, …[and] were … interdependent.”180 Put differently, “[t]he contract with the 
‘fronter’ would not have been entered into unless the ‘fronter’ would reinsure with the 
connected company.”181 This case therefore clearly shows that a provision may exist 
between two affected persons even where an independent third party has been 
 
177 INTM 412050: Transfer pricing: legislation: rules: meaning of “provision” and “transaction” 
<https://library.croneri.co.uk/cch_uk/irm/intm-intm412050> (accessed 06-09-2020). 
178 Section 164 of TIOPA. 
179 [2009] STC (SCD) 397. 
180 INTM412050: Transfer pricing: legislation: rules: meaning of “provision” and “transaction”. 





interposed in-between the affected persons’ transaction in the aim of facilitating the 
avoidance of the transaction falling within the net of a “provision,” thereby 
circumventing the application of the UK’s transfer pricing legislation.  
 
3.4.4 Domestic relevance of the term “control” 
The participation condition requires that “one of the affected persons was directly 
or indirectly participating in the management, control or capital of the other.” Control 
is, therefore, a fundamental requirement to trigger a possible transfer pricing 
adjustment. 
The terms “capital” and “management” seem relatively trite and are therefore not 
addressed further. The term “control”, on the other hand, requires further analysis in 
order to digest its meaning.  
 
3.4.4.1 Control 
TIOPA, fortunately, defines the term under section 217, which cross-references the 
term “control” as contained in section 1124 of the Corporation Tax Act 2010. Section 
1124 provides the following: 
 
“(2) In relation to a body corporate (“company A”), “control” means the power of a person 
(“P”) to secure— 
(a) by means of the holding of shares or the possession of voting power in relation 
to that or any other body corporate, or 
(b) as a result of any powers conferred by the articles of association or other 
document regulating that or any other body corporate, 
that the affairs of company A are conducted in accordance with P’s wishes.  
(3) In relation to a partnership, “control” means the right to a share of more than half the 
assets, or of more than half the income, of the partnership.” 
 
The form of control envisioned by subsection (2)(a) of the definition appears to be 
limited to control in the form of shareholding or management. There does not, 
however, appear to be a limitation in subsection (2)(b) as to what form of control must 
exist but rather the method of its inception (that is; as a result of any powers conferred 
by the articles of association or other document regulating that company). Any form of 
control arising from such documents mentioned in subsection (2)(b) will, therefore, 





other than control in the form of management, albeit controversial, may be where a 
company borrows funds from a lender, to the extent that such funding is subject to the 
lender being given the power to approve or deny any financial proposals182 made by 
the board of the borrowing company in terms of the document regulating that 
borrowing company. 183 
Subsection (3) exclusively caters for partnerships and appears to provide that any 
partner of that partnership that is entitled to more than half the share of the partnership 
is considered to control that partnership. 
 
3.4.4.2  Degree of participation required 
Sections 157 to 163 define what constitutes participation in the management, 
control or capital. 184  These sections therefore describe the level, or degree, of 
participation, required. Additionally, HMRC’s Commentary notes that these sections 
also “set out rules that attribute rights and powers to a person when considering 
whether that person controls a company or partnership.”185  
Section 157 defines direct participation as follows: 
 
“(2) a person is directly participating in the management, control or capital of another 
person at a particular time if (and only if) that other person is at that time – 
(a) a body corporate or a firm, and 
(b) controlled by the first person.” 
 
This subsection may possibly shed light on the entire issue that this dissertation 
addresses (that is; what does “participation in management, capital or control” mean), 
because the UK legislation actually defines the phrase “participating in the 
 
182 Such as any decisions pertaining to the company’s capital expenditure or acquisitions, 
the incurral of further debt or any other material arrangement. 
183 The question whether amending the document regulating that borrowing company to 
cater for the lender in such manner is a question of company law, which falls outside the 
scope of this dissertation. To the extent that the document regulating that borrowing 
company remains unchanged, and the lender relies on a contractual right instead, then such 
a lender relationship will arguably not constitute de facto control in the narrow sense. 
184 INTM412060: Transfer pricing: legislation: rules: participation in the management, control 
or capital of a person available <https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/international-
manual/intm412060> (accessed 06-09-2020). 
185 INTM412060: Transfer pricing: legislation: rules: participation in the management, control 





management, control or capital,” which is the exact phrase that is used in Article 9 of 
the OECD MTC. 
What is clear from section 157(2) is that in order for one to constitute an associated 
enterprise in relation to a company, the level of participation required in the 
management or capital of such company must be to such extent that one controls that 
company (that is, when one has the power to secure that the affairs of the company 
are conducted in accordance with one’s wishes). The power to secure that the 
company is conducted in accordance with one’s wishes would generally require one 
to hold more than 50% participation in management, or of the share capital (together 
with an equivalent percentage of voting rights). 
Although not crucial to this dissertation, it appears that the domestic definition of 
control, read together with section 157 (which defines direct participation) appears to 
give rise to some redundancies. The definition of control provides that control exists 
when a person has the power to secure that the affairs of the company in question are 
conducted in accordance with that person’s wishes, either by means of the holding of 
shares, or as a result of any powers conferred by the articles of association or other 
document regulating that company (which is generally, but not always, power in the 
form of management via the board of directors). The definition of control contained in 
section 1124(2) of the Corporation Tax Act of 2010 therefore already appears to 
contain a participation requirement both in the form of shareholding or in management 
(or some other form of control arising from such documents mentioned in subsection 
(2)(b)). 
The similarity between the wording of Article 9 of the OECD MTC and the UK 
transfer pricing legislation is indicative of an identical intention. Considering this, it 
seems appropriate to glean from the interpretive aids (such as the definition of direct 
participation) when interpreting the meaning of Article 9. In summary, it seems that an 
argument could be made that the phrase “participate directly … in the management, 
… or capital of an enterprise” should be interpreted in a manner similar to section 
157(2)(b) of TIOPA (that is; direct participation in management or capital is to mean 
participation in management or capital to such extent that the participant has control 
over that entity). This argument is further elaborated on in chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
Section 158 explains how one must read the definition of indirect participation. It 
provides, firstly, that, for the purposes of sections 148(2)(a) and (3)(a) (that is, the 





participation exists if section 159, 160 or 161 provides for it. Secondly, it provides that 
for the purposes of sections 148(2)(b) and (3)(b) (that is; the alternative requirement 
that the same person(s) control both affected persons), indirect participation exists if 
section 159, 160 or 162 provides for it. Sections 159 and 160, therefore, apply to both 
requirements, while section 161 and 162 only apply to one alternative requirement. 
3.4.4.3  Attribution rules (section 159) 
Section 159(2) appears to provide that certain rights are to be attributed to a person 
when determining whether or not that person controls another person. Subsection (3) 
goes on to list the rights that are to be attributed to that person. Subsections (3)(a) and 
(b) attribute future rights that a person is entitled or will become entitled to acquire. 
Subsection (d) attributes rights of a person’s connected persons to that person, and 
subsection (e) takes the attribution rules a step further by attributing the rights to a 
person that would be attributed to that person’s connected person under subsections 
(a) and (b). Lastly, subsection (c) attributes the rights of a third party, as per subsection 
(4), to a person. According to HMRC’s Commentary, the rights and powers under 
subsection (4) that are to be attributed to a person generally belong to a third party, 
but may need to be exercised on behalf of or for the benefit of that person.186 
 
3.4.4.4  Indirect participation (section 160) 
Section 160 provides that one is indirectly participating in the management or 
capital of another person if one is “one of a number of major participants in that other 
person’s enterprise.” 
Subsection (3) goes on to define a major participant as follows: 
 
“(3) For the purposes of this section, a person (“A”) is a major participant in another 
person’s enterprise at a particular time if at that time— 
(a)  that other person (“the subordinate”) is a body corporate or firm, and 
(b)  the 40% test is met in the case of each of two persons— 
(i)  who, taken together, control the subordinate, and 
(ii)  of whom one is A.” 
 
 
186 INTM412060: Transfer pricing: legislation: rules: participation in the management, control 





Subsection (3)(a) seems to indicate that the subordinate must either be a company 
or a partnership. Furthermore, subsection (3)(b) requires the 40% test to be met in 
order for one to be considered to be a major participant. 
Subsection (4) appears to be the actual subsection that defines when the 40% test 
has been met. This section provides as follows: 
 
“(4) For the purposes of this section, the 40% test is met in the case of each of two persons 
wherever each of them has interests, rights and powers representing at least 40% of the 
holdings, rights and powers in respect of which the pair of them fall to be taken as 
controlling the subordinate.” 
 
According to the Commentary on section 160 of TIOPA,187 two requirements must 
be met in order to satisfy the 40% test. First, the two persons must control the company 
or partnership. Second, each person must hold at least 40% interest in the company 
or partnership.  
Section 160 also provides for attribution rules. 
 
“(5)  For the purposes of this section— 
(a)  the question whether a person is controlled by any two or more persons taken 
together, and 
(b)  any question whether the 40% test is met in the case of a person who is one 
of two persons, is to be determined after attributing to each of the persons all 
the rights and powers which would be attributed by section 159(2) to a person 
were it being decided under section 159(2) whether that person is indirectly 
participating in the management, control or capital of another person. 
(6)  References in this section— 
(a)  to rights and powers of a person, or 
(b)  to rights and powers which a person is or will become entitled to acquire, 
include references to rights or powers which are exercisable by that person, or 
(when acquired by that person) will be exercisable, only jointly with one or more 
other persons.” 
 
3.4.4.5  Indirect participation in relation to financing cases (section 161) 
Section 161(2) of TIOPA provides as follows: 
 
“A person (“P”) is indirectly participating in the management, control or capital of another 
(“A”) at the time of the making or imposition of the actual provision if— 
 





(a) the actual provision relates, to any extent, to financing arrangements for A, 
(b) A is a body corporate or firm, 
(c) P and other persons acted together in relation to the financing arrangements, and 
(d) P would be taken to have control of A if, at any relevant time, there were attributed to P 
the rights and powers of each of the other persons mentioned in paragraph (c).” 
 
Section 161 appears to extend the scope of the participation condition to cover a 
person (“P”) that acted together with other persons to enter into a finance arrangement 
with a tested party, to the extent that P would have control over the tested party if the 
rights and powers of the other persons were attributed to P. 
 
3.4.5  Comparison to South Africa  
The UK definition does not provide different requirements for the participation 
condition to be met in respect of different forms of legal persons. 
The most significant aspect to highlight is that the UK focuses on control through 
shareholding or management, whereas SA includes additional de facto forms of 
control. It appears that the UK also includes other forms of control, but such other 
forms of control are limited to powers (which give rise to the control) conferred by the 
articles of association or other document regulating that company. Unlike SA, the UK 
does not appear to consider de facto control in the narrow sense to constitute control. 
 
3.5 United States 
3.5.1  Trigger for the applicability of a transfer pricing adjustment 
The primary transfer pricing legislation in the US is S482 of the Internal Revenue 
Code, which provides as follows: 
 
“in any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not 
incorporated , whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated) 
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may 
distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between 
or among such organizations, trades or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, 
apportionment or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to 
reflect the income of any such organizations, trades or businesses …”188 
 
188 Section 482 goes on to provide that “In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible 






Upon reading this section, it appears that one can view this section in three parts, 
the first being a trigger for the application of the second part. The trigger that needs to 
be met is that there needs to be at least two organisations that are directly or indirectly 
owned or controlled by the same interests. Once this trigger has been met, then the 
second part of section 482 can be accessed, which entitles the Internal Revenue 
Service (“IRS”) to make a transfer pricing adjustment. This second part, however, is 
subject to the parameters of the third part, which is that an adjustment may only be 
made if the Secretary has concluded that such adjustment is necessary to either 
prevent tax evasion or to clearly reflect the income of any such organisations. 
Regulation 1.482.1(b) makes it abundantly clear that when establishing the true 
income of such organisation, “the standard to be applied in every case is that of a 
taxpayer dealing at arm’s length with an uncontrolled taxpayer.”189  
 
3.5.2  Relevance of the term “control” 
Control is required over an organisation in order for a transfer pricing adjustment to 
apply. Regulation 1.482-1(i)(4)190 provides that “it is the reality of the control that is 
decisive, not its form or the mode of its existence.” Furthermore, the regulation 
provides that there is a presumption of control if profits have been shifted arbitrarily.  
Academics have previously opined that the US domestic definition of control is 
defined as de facto control.191 The decisive factor in establishing whether control 
exists, according to academics, is whether a person, in fact, can dictate the price of a 
particular transaction.192  
It seems relatively trite that the basis of control may well be routed in the form of 
shareholding or control of voting rights. Obviously, one may, therefore, obtain control 
 
or license shall be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible.” Section 482 
appears to provide special rules pertaining to the transferring or licensing of intangible 
property. Although one must be cognisant of such special rules, these special rules fall outside 
the scope of this dissertation and therefore will not be included in the analysis herein. 
189 Treas Reg § 1.482 (1)(b). 
190 Treas Reg §1.482-1(i)(4). 
191 J Wittendorff Transfer pricing and the arm’s length principle in international tax law (2010) 
65. 





though holding more than 50% shareholding or voting rights in a person. Although the 
holding of more than 50% shareholding or voting rights would generally be indicative 
of one having control over another person, Wittendorf points out this will not be the 
case if the person is actually controlled by other interests.193 Furthermore, Wittendorf 
also points out what some may consider obvious in an era of shareholder apathy, 
being that one can also factually control another person even if one only holds a 
minority shareholding in that person.194  
An interesting point to note is that control may be considered to exist even where 
an independent third party has been interposed in-between two or more controlled 
persons (as in the UK case of DSG v HMRC).195 A transaction between two controlled 
persons will, therefore, still fall within the scope of section 482 irrespective of whether 
or not an independent person has been interposed in the transaction.196 
 
3.5.3  Comparison with South Africa 
The US definition does not provide different requirements for the participation 
condition to be met in respect of different forms of legal persons. 
The US transfer pricing legislation caters for cases where an intermediary has been 
interposed in-between the associated parties. This is consistent with the position in 
SA, the UK as well as India. 
The US defines control as de facto control. Unlike SA, the US does this by simply 
providing for a general qualitative definition of control. SA, on the other hand, mostly 
provides specific quantitative definitions for a connected person in relation to a specific 
type of person. The South African definition of a connected person, however, also 
includes a person that controls another person. The SARS Interpretation Note 67 
provides that control is undefined and is to be given its ordinary meaning, which is de 
facto control. The domestic meaning that has been ascribed to the term “control” in 
SA is therefore relatively similar to that in the US. 
 
 
193 Wittendorf Transfer pricing 65. 
194 65. 
195  Internal Revenue Bulletin 2002-44 (04-11-2002) <https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb02-






3.6  Conclusion 
Although one can see from the above that the proliferation of unilateral measures 
has resulted in some inconsistencies in the domestic approaches to determining what 
transactions should fall within the net of the domestic transfer pricing legislation, there 
are also a number of similarities amongst the various domestic approaches. The 
inconsistencies in the domestic approaches can initially be identified from the fact that 
different terminology is utilised by different states, albeit that the differing terminologies 
seem to aim to cater for the same thing (being connectivity to another). India uses the 
term “associated enterprise,” which is inter alia defined as a person that participates 
in the control, management, or the capital of a company. In the UK, the “participation 
condition” must be met, which requires one of the affected persons to be directly or 
indirectly participating in the management, control or capital of the other. In the United 
States, a transfer pricing adjustment may be made if at least two organisations are 
owned or controlled by the same interests. Lastly, in SA, the contracting parties need 
to be a connected person (which includes parties that are managed or controlled by 
another, as well as various participation requirements pertaining to capital), or (as of 
January 2021 (or 2022, if the draft amendment in terms of Clause 78 of the Taxation 
Laws Amendment Bill 2020 is accepted)) an associated enterprise in relation to each 
other. 
The obvious similarities in the various domestic approaches is that they all include 
some form of interest in the management, capital or control of an entity. On the other 
hand, the most important differences that need to be mentioned are the differences in 
the level of participation required in capital or management, and differences in 
interpretation of what constitutes control amongst the above-mentioned states (being 
de jure control, de facto control in the narrow sense, and de facto control in the broad 
sense that includes various open market arrangements). 
Regarding the level of participation required, direct participation is defined in the UK 
as participation in capital or management to the extent that one has control. The level 
of participation required is therefore generally more than 50% in capital (together with 
voting rights) or management. In the United States it is the reality of the control that is 
decisive, not its form or the mode of its existence. More than 50% participation in 
capital would therefore also generally be required in the United States. This general 





there are apathetic shareholders or board members that have resulted in a person 
obtaining control with less than 50% participation in capital or management. In India, 
the participation requirement is 26% shareholding, which is considerably less than 
what is generally required in the above-mentioned states. 
South African domestic legislation imposes a participation requirement of 20% if no 
other holder of shares holds the majority voting rights. Alternatively, the participation 
requirement is more than 50%, to the extent that the arrangement does not pertain to 
financial assistance or IP (in which case the participation requirement is 20%). In 
addition to the participation requirement, entities that are managed or controlled by a 
person are connected to such person. The analysis above found that control is 
interpreted as de facto control in SA, which again means that the general participation 
requirement could arguably not limit the existence of a connected person relationship 
(particularly where it can be proven that there are apathetic shareholders that have 
resulted in a person obtaining control of certain decisions at a shareholders meeting 
with less than 50% participation in capital). 
Regarding the similarities and differences in interpretation of what constitutes 
control, direct participation is defined in the UK as participation in capital or 
management to the extent that one has control. This is generally referred to as de jure 
control. The UK, however, also considers a person to control a company if, as a result 
of any powers conferred by the articles of association or other document regulating 
that company, the company is conducted in accordance with that person’s wishes. 
Control is also defined in the US domestic legislation. Unlike the UK, however, the 
definition of control is based on an open-ended concept of de facto control. What is 
evident from the United States’ domestic legislation is that it is not the form of control 
that is material, but rather it is the reality of control that is decisive.  
Although control is not expressly defined by India’s domestic legislation, Indian 
domestic legislation does specifically stipulate that the relationships listed therein are 
indicative of a controlled relationship existing. These listed relationships generally 
provide for de jure control and de facto control in the broad sense that includes a 





The South African domestic law definition of a connected person also refers to the 
term “control,” which the South African courts have held means de facto control.197 
However, it is submitted that the form of de facto control referred to in Interpretation 
Note 67, as well as in the court cases referred to therein, is narrower than the types of 
relationships that India considers to give rise to de facto control. This submission is 
based on the fact that SA’s interpretation of de facto control considers whether there 
is in substance control via management (which is in all likelihood aimed at including 
entities that try to artificially avoid the associated enterprise or connected person 
definition as being controlled by another entity). The connected person definition, 
however, also appears to be broad enough to possibly include persons that can control 
a company by virtue of some form of the power conferred by that company’s 
memorandum of incorporation or some other document governing the company (as is 
the case in the UK, and arguably also the US). An example may include the power 
given by a company to an independent creditor (by way of an amendment to the 
document regulating that borrowing company)198 to veto any decisions pertaining to 
the company’s capital expenditure or disposals, or the incurral of further debt or any 
other material arrangement.  
The above analysis clearly illustrates that the above-mentioned states do not all 
impose an identical participation level required to give rise to association, nor do they 
all interpret the term “control” identically domestically. Regarding the latter, the 
predominant interpretations are de jure control and de facto control, and de facto 
control also appears to be capable of being interpreted in a narrow manner as well as 
a broad manner. The narrow interpretation appears to aim at regarding entities that 
are in substance controlled by another via management or in terms of a legal 
agreement or a document that governs the decision-making powers of a company 
such as a memorandum of incorporation, while the broad interpretation appears to 
include certain commercial relationships that may give rise to one entity being 
 
197 S v Pouroulis 1993 4 S A 575 (W); ITC 1741 65 SATC 106; SARS “Interpretation Note 67 
(issue 4)” (28-01-2020) SARS. 
198 The question whether amending the document regulating that borrowing company to 
cater for the lender in such manner is a question of company law, which falls outside the 
scope of this dissertation. To the extent that the document regulating that borrowing 
company remains unchanged, and the lender relies on a contractual right instead, then such 





commercially dependent on the other. This may well give rise to uncertainty when 







CHAPTER 4: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TWO PREDOMINANT (AND 
OPPOSING) VIEWS ON INTERPRETING ARTICLE 9  
4.1 Introduction  
Generally, Article 9 of the OECD MTC provides that contracting states may rewrite 
the accounts of an entity if, due to the special relationship between the entities, the 
accounts do not show the true taxable profit arising in that state.199 
Article 9(1) of the OECD MTC provides as follows: 
 
“Where 
a) an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the 
management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State, or 
b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or 
capital of an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other 
Contracting State,  
and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their 
commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made between 
independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have 
accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, 
may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly.” 
 
Article 9 of the OECD MTC is titled “Article 9: Associated Enterprises,” and the 
content of Article 9(1) defines this term. Article 9 therefore effectively provides for two 
instances in which an associated enterprise relationship may exist. First, in cases 
where one enterprise participates in the management, control or capital of another 
enterprise. Second, where the same mutual person(s) participate in the management, 
control or capital of both enterprises. 
It must be noted that the terms “management”, “control” and “capital” are expressed 
as distinct terms that are not synonymous with each other. In other words, “control is 
presented as something other than ‘participation in the management’ or ‘participation 
in the capital’.”200 Since participation in either management, control or capital can give 
rise to an associated enterprise relationship, one must comprehend what these terms 
mean. The words contained in the phrase “participates directly … in the management, 
 
199 OECD Commentary on Article 9 para 2. 
200  G Cottani “Transfer pricing, topical analyses” (2016) IBFD 40 





control or capital”, however, are not defined in the OECD MTC. Accordingly, the words 
contained in this phrase fall within the ambit of Article 3(2) of the OECD MTC, which 
deals with undefined terms and must be applied to these terms. 
Article 3(2) provides as follows: 
 
“As regards the application of the Convention at any time by a Contracting State, any term 
not defined therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires or the competent authorities 
agree to a different meaning pursuant to the provisions of Article 25, have the meaning that 
it has at that time under the law of that State for the purposes of the taxes to which the 
Convention applies, any meaning under the applicable tax laws of that State prevailing over 
a meaning given to the term under other laws of that State.”  
 
As discussed below, some academics are of the view that the words contained in 
the phrase “participates directly … in the management, control or capital” are to take 
the meaning of its domestic definition of the state applying the DTA. Others, however, 
argue that the context requires otherwise. 
The reasons why certainty over this point is required are twofold. The first reason 
is that corresponding adjustments can only be made if, according to the Commentary 
on Article 9, the other state agrees with the primary transfer pricing adjustment in 
principle.201 This point is also made in the OECD TPG, which provides that the state 
from which a corresponding adjustment is requested should comply with this request 
only if that state “considers that the figure of adjusted profits correctly reflects what the 
profits would have been if the transactions had been at arm’s length”.202 The second 
reason why certainty over this point is required is due to the fact that the definition or 
meaning of the term “control” may be fundamental in determining whether certain 
transactional data between two particular entities constitutes uncontrolled comparable 
pricing data, which is a vital form of data that may be used by entities to justify the 
arm’s length nature of their transfer price.  
The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to seek clarity on the meaning of the 
phrase “participates directly … in the management, control or capital”. This will be 
done by briefly considering the rules governing the interpretation of DTAs, which will 
be followed by a short discussion on some of the difficulties surrounding the 
application of Article 3(2), as well as an analysis of the opposing views on interpreting 
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Article 9. The preceding chapters hereto have clarified two major points that one needs 
to comprehend before dealing with this question. The first being clarifying the 
relationship between DTAs and domestic legislation, and the second being 
establishing that different states do, in fact, have differing definitions for the phrase 
“participates directly … in the management, control or capital”.  
  
4.2 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties  
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention contains the primary rules of 
interpreting international treaties (including DTAs),203 which has been largely accepted 
to constitute a codification of pre-existing customary international law.204 According to 
section 232 of the Constitution, customary international law generally constitutes law 
in SA. Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention are therefore enforceable in SA,205 
even though SA is not a signatory to the Vienna Convention at the time of writing this 
dissertation. The content of these respective articles, as well as their impact, therefore, 
need to be considered. 
 
4.2.1 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention 
This article provides as follows: 
 
“Article 31 GENERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition 
to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
 
203 EC Jansen van Rensburg A South African perspective on the meaning of “beneficial 
ownership” in Article 10 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital in the 
context of conduit company treaty shopping. LLD dissertation, University of Pretoria (2017) 
101. M Sada Garibay “An analysis of the case law on Article 3(2) of the OECD Model (2010)” 
(2011) 65 Bulletin for International Taxation. 
204 U Linderfalk & M Hilling “The use of OECD Commentaries as interpretative aids – The 
static/ambulatory–approaches debate considered from the perspective of international law” 
(2015) Nordic Tax Journal 34, 36; P Baker Double taxation conventions 3 ed (2019) para E.03. 
205 Krok v C:SARS 2015 6 SA 317 (SCA) para 27 and s 232 of the Constitution. See also Du 





(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related 
to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties. 
4.  A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so 
intended.” 
 
Article 31(1) clearly provides that the “ordinary meaning” of a DTA term is to be 
established by considering its context and the purpose of that DTA. Put differently, 
one must apply the ordinary meaning to an undefined treaty term, given its context 
and the purpose of the treaty (which may be expressed in the preamble of the DTA).206 
It is therefore apparent that an interpretation which achieves the object of the DTA 
should be favoured above one which does not.207 
Since the ordinary meaning of an undefined term is to be determined with 
consideration of the context and purpose of the DTA, “[i]n context, a technical meaning 
may become the ordinary meaning. This is particularly true in the context of tax treaties 
where tax expressions frequently have a meaning that is different from the ordinary 
meaning of the words.”208 This argument is also contained in the Commentary to the 
Vienna Convention, which provides that “technical or special use of the term normally 
appears from the context and the technical or special meaning becomes, as it were, 
the ordinary meaning in the particular context.”209 Relying on the research conducted 
 
206  Jansen van Rensburg A South African perspective on the meaning of “beneficial 
ownership” 109. 
207 COT v Aktiebolaget Tetra Pak 1966 28 SATC 217. 
208 A Jones “Treaty interpretation” in R Vann (ed) Global tax treaty commentaries (2015) para 
3.4.11 
209 Para 17 of the Commentary to the Vienna Convention. Jansen van Rensburg suggests that 
the Commentary does not support this view, but instead indicates that special meanings will 





by Linderfalk, Jansen van Rensburg concludes that “‘the ordinary meaning’ in Article 
31(1) includes technical meanings that are usually used in the particular context.”210 
There is, however, a view amongst some academics that such preference for 
context over the literal meaning of a term is not permissible to establish the ordinary 
meaning of a term, but instead can only be permitted to establish the special meaning 
of a word in terms of Article 31(4)211 (which provides that a special meaning may be 
ascribed to the term if it is established that the parties to the treaty in question so 
intended).  
The meaning of an undefined term contained in a DTA cannot be determined 
without regard to its context and the purpose of the DTA in question.212 Consequently, 
Jansen Van Rensburg argues that either a “nuanced”213 or “contextual”214 approach 
should be applied when interpreting the content of a DTA,215 and appears to suggest 
that South African courts will in all likelihood apply a contextual approach.216 One, 
therefore, needs to be able to identify the relevant context when establishing the 
meaning of an undefined term that is contained in a DTA. 
 
4.2.2 Context for purposes of establishing the ordinary meaning in terms of Article 
31(1) 
As mentioned above, Article 31(1) refers to the ordinary meaning of terms in the 
context and in light of the purpose of the DTA. Jansen van Rensburg notes that the 
dominant view appears to be that the context, for purposes of establishing the ordinary 
 
210  Jansen van Rensburg A South African perspective on the meaning of “beneficial 
ownership” 106 referring to Linderfalk & Hilling (2015) Nordic Tax Journal 44. 
211 DA Ward et al The interpretation of income tax treaties with particular reference to the 
commentaries on the OECD Model (2005) 19, 21 and 26-27. 
212  Jansen van Rensburg A South African perspective on the meaning of “beneficial 
ownership” 102. 
213 A nuanced approach requires the context and purpose of the treaty to be considered, but 
that can never override the clear meaning of the text. 
214 A contextual approach allows one to interpret the meaning of the words in the light of the 
context and purpose. 







meaning in terms of Article 31(1), is to be determined concerning the material referred 
to in Article 31(2) and (3).217 
Article 31(2) identifies a closed list of items that may constitute the context when 
determining the ordinary meaning of a term. This includes the entire text of the relevant 
treaty, as well as agreements and instruments that relate to the relevant treaty that 
was accepted by all the relevant parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty. 
This would in all likelihood include the preamble to a DTA, which typically provides the 
purpose of the DTA. 
Article 31(3) further provides a closed list of content that may be taken into 
consideration for purposes of establishing the ordinary meaning of the term in 
accordance with its context and purpose. Article 31(3) allows one to consider any 
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty 
or the application of its provisions, any subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation, as 
well as any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties. 
 
4.2.3 Supplementary means of interpretation: Article 32 
Article 32 provides as follows: 
 
“Article 32 SUPPLEMENTARY MEANS OF INTERPRETATION 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning 
resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article 31: 
(a)  Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b)  Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” 
 
Article 32, therefore, entitles a person to supplementary means of interpreting an 
undefined treaty term. The applicability of Article 32 is limited to, inter alia, instances 
where the application of Article 31 results in the undefined term being given a meaning 
that gives rise to an absurdity, obscurity or ambiguity. Such conditions resulting in the 
applicability of Article 32 are broad. 
 






Unlike Article 31(2) and (3), Article 32 does not provide a closed list of material that 
may be considered when interpreting an undefined term in accordance with Article 
32.218 An argument can, therefore, be made that the Commentary to the OECD MTC 
may be considered, 219220  as well as historical research 221  when interpreting an 
undefined term in a DTA in terms of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.  
Regarding the former, the UK courts in Re the Trevor Smallwood Trust; Smallwood 
v HMRC222 held that the Commentaries may reflect the intention of the parties of the 
relevant DTA. 223  The court in ITC 1878 224  also held that the Commentaries are 
perceived as a tool that promotes the aim of common and uniform interpretation. 
Various case law from India has also recognised the importance of interpreting DTAs 
in accordance with the intention of the signatories,225 including Deputy Commissioner 
of Income Tax v. Metchem Canada Inc, which held that the Commentaries apply to 
the extent that the parties had not expressly indicated a different intention.226 The US 
judgment in National Westminster Bank plc v. United States of America (2008) also 
confirmed the obligation to interpret the provisions of a DTA in a way that gives effect 
to the intention of the signatories. Therefore, although not law, the Commentaries 
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arguably constitute material that may be considered in interpreting the terms contained 
in the relevant DTA.227  
 
4.3 Ancillary consideration when interpreting DTAs 
Although not provided for by the Vienna Convention, the goals of common and 
uniform interpretation also need to be mentioned before addressing the remainder of 
this dissertation. These goals seem to stem from the fact that a DTA gives rise to the 
reciprocal allocation of taxing rights, “which encourages contracting states to seek a 
common interpretation of treaty terms (the ‘goal of common interpretation’)”. 228 
Furthermore, the international character of DTAs is indicative that their content should 
be interpreted uniformly across all states that apply the wording of that DTA.229 Jansen 
van Rensburg has expressed that “DTAs that are modelled on the OECD MTC would 
be an example of treaties that lend themselves to such a uniform interpretation.”230 
The pursuit of the goals of common and uniform interpretation would in all likelihood 
result in undefined terms contained in a DTA to be interpreted consistently by the 
relevant contracting states. Jansen van Rensburg has mentioned that this implies that 
DTA terms should be interpreted in such manner that an autonomous meaning,231 as 
opposed to a domestic meaning, should be ascribed to the undefined DTA term.232 It 
is respectfully submitted that, given that the opposite of an autonomous meaning 
would be a domestic meaning, an autonomous meaning would arguably derive from 
the context and purpose of the DTA provision in question (that is; a source other than 
domestic law). 
 
227 There are opposing views as to whether the Commentaries fall within the ambit of Article 
31(1) or Article 32. This distinction has been noted as immaterial in relation to this dissertation 
and has therefore not been addressed further. 
228  Jansen van Rensburg A South African perspective on the meaning of “beneficial 
ownership” 98. 
229 Baker Double Taxation Conventions paras E-26 – E-28. 
230  Jansen van Rensburg A South African perspective on the meaning of “beneficial 
ownership” 99. 
231 With reference to Schwarz on Tax Treaties para 12-300, Van Rensburg suggests that 
Schwarz seems to equate the term with the “international fiscal meaning”.  






The goals of common and uniform interpretation also seem to find support from 
section 232 of the Constitution. Section 232 of the Constitution provides that 
“Customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament.”233 Olivier and Honiball state that, based on 
section 232 of the Constitution, “to the extent that there are OECD guidelines on the 
interpretation of the concept [in question] … as utilized in tax treaties worldwide, South 
African courts would take cognizance of such guidelines … to interpret the meaning 
in the context of a tax treaty.”234 
 
4.4 Applying Article 3(2) 
Article 3(2) requires one to apply a contracting states’ domestic definition of a term 
that is undefined in the convention. However, where the context requires otherwise, 
then domestic definitions are not to be applied. The following text will discuss some of 
the difficulties surrounding the application of Article 3(2), as well as an analysis of the 
opposing views on interpreting Article 9. 
 
4.4.1 What constitutes context? 
With reference to the work of Avery Jones,235 Baker,236 as well as Rust,237 Jansen 
van Rensburg submits that the “context” referred to in Article 3(2) includes all listed 
materials contained in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, and arguably also includes 
the materials referred to under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.238 Rust expresses 
that “the ‘context’ concept should nevertheless be interpreted as broadly as 
possible.”239 Rust then goes on to provide examples of material that would constitute 
context, which includes the text of the treaty, supplementary instruments thereto, the 
object and purpose of the provision, the relevant provisions of the two national legal 
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238  Jansen van Rensburg A South African perspective on the meaning of “beneficial 
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systems, as well as the OECD MTC Commentary.240 As for what constitutes the 
“context”, Lang states that it not only encompasses the entire OECD MTC, “but also 
the preparatory work of the OECD Model such as the Commentary.”241 Paragraph 6 
of the OECD Commentary on Article 9 provides that a corresponding transfer pricing 
adjustment is only due if the state that is being requested to make a corresponding 
adjustment considers the initial primary adjustment made by the other state to be 
justified in principle as well as the amount.242 This point is also made in the OECD 
TPG, which also provides context relating to Article 9 of the OECD MTC.243 
In the pursuit of context for Article 9 of the OECD MTC, Dwarkasing considers the 
historical development of Article 9 of the MTC. One of the bodies of work referred to 
by Dwarkasing is Article 5 of the 1933 Report,244 which is the predecessor to the 
OECD MTC. According to Dwarkasing, “the term ‘participation in “control”’ is not meant 
to be an independent criterion for association, but the term is a substitute for the term 
‘dominating’ used in Art. 5 of the 1933 Report”.245 
 
4. 4. 2 When does context require otherwise 
Jansen van Rensburg identifies two existing views as to when the context requires 
otherwise for purposes of Article 3(2) of the OECD MTC. The first being that the 
domestic meaning of a term should only be applied as a last resort.246 Promoters of 
this view generally rely on the goal of common and uniform interpretation as support 
for this argument, which would possibly be hindered if domestic meanings were 
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ascribed to undefined DTA terms. 247  The second view identified by Jansen van 
Rensburg is that the domestic meaning is to be preferred and can only be avoided to 
the extent that there are reasonably strong arguments to the contrary.248 This view is 
supported by Rust, who previously stated that “an interpretation contrary to the 
meaning a term has under domestic law must constitute an exception.”249 
South African case law has also indicated that the domestic meaning of an 
undefined DTA term will be utilised by a South African court, unless it is clear from the 
context that the domestic meaning should not be utilised. This was the finding of the 
Appellate Division in Baldwins (South Africa) Ltd v CIR, 250  wherein the court 
considered in what instance the context would require one to deviate from the 
domestic definition of an undefined DTA term. The court appears to suggest that the 
weight of the context would need to be strong in order for a court to deviate from the 
domestic meaning of a term.251  
Although not settled, there is a view amongst some academics that the above-
mentioned judgment was not deviated from in the more recent judgment of 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd. 252  This 
argument is premised on the conclusion that the court applied the domestic meaning 
to an undefined DTA term, which is based on the fact that the court only referred to 
domestic law when interpreting the undefined DTA term.253 However, the court makes 
reference to the existence of “international tax language,” which Du Plessis argues 
suggests that the domestic definition was not ascribed as the meaning of the 
undefined DTA term.254 
Rust expresses that “context will for instance require an interpretation different from 
domestic law if the domestic law meaning would render parts of the treaty 
 
247 287. 
248 287 referring to Rust “Article 3(2)” in Klaus Vogel 212 m.nr. 123 notes that “weighty 
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inapplicable”.255 Rust also states that in instances “… where an interpretation in light 
of domestic law … leads to … double non-taxation, then there are already strong 
arguments for a contextual interpretation provided that a contextual interpretation 
helps to avoid such undesirable results.”256 It seems reasonable to conclude that this 
argument would remain valid in cases where an interpretation in light of domestic law 
will not alleviate economic double taxation, particularly since the argument is based 
on the DTA provision achieving its purpose (and the purpose of Article 9(2) is to avoid 
economic double taxation from arising, as discussed below). 
According to Dwarkasing, the phrase “unless the context requires otherwise” as 
found in Article 3(2) of the OECD MTC “refers to situations where a reference to an 
interpretation according to domestic law fails to provide a clear solution to the 
particular tax issue.”257 Put differently, Dwarkasing argues that the context requires 
otherwise when the application of the domestic meaning of the undefined DTA term 
will not result in the provision achieving its purpose. On this point, Dwarkasing submits 
that the purpose of Article 9(2) of the OECD MTC is to prevent economic double 
taxation.258 In other words, the particular tax issue that requires a solution is the issue 
of economic double taxation, and where an interpretation of a treaty term is following 
the domestic interpretation of such term but yet the issue of economic double taxation 
remains unresolved, then this is indicative of the context requiring otherwise and for 
the treaty term to be interpreted without solely relying on domestic interpretations.  
 
4.5 Article 9 
4.5.1 Applying the meaning of a term in accordance with the law of the State 
applying the convention (Cottani’s view) 
According to Cottani, “Article 9(1) … is not self-supporting, in that it depends on the 
domestic law of the various treaty partners for its interpretation and clarification.”259 
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Cottani seems to make this assertion due to none of the terms contained in the phrase 
“participation in management, control or capital” being defined by the OECD MTC and 
hence falling within the scope of Article 3(2) of the OECD MTC. Cottani then goes on 
to conclude that participation in “management, control or capital” “will have the 
meaning as determined under the domestic tax law of the country applying the 
convention, unless the context requires otherwise.”260 Cottani does not, however, 
appear to consider the context of Article 9 as requiring otherwise. Cottani’s view, 
therefore, seems to conclude that the terms contained in the phrase “participation in 
management, control or capital” are to be defined as per the domestic definition of a 
contracting state. Other academics have also supported Cottani’s view.261 
It will be recalled that the OECD Commentary on corresponding transfer pricing 
adjustments provides that a contracting state is only required to make a corresponding 
transfer pricing adjustment if it agrees with the primary adjustment in principle.262 
Considering this, the consequence of applying Cottani’s view is that countries may, in 
some cases, refuse to provide taxpayers with relief from economic double taxation 
through the form of a corresponding transfer pricing adjustment. Relief in the form of 
a corresponding transfer pricing adjustment may be refused where the contracting 
state disagrees with the primary transfer pricing adjustment in principle. When applying 
Cottani’s view, there is a risk that a corresponding transfer pricing adjustment may be 
refused because of the contracting state disagreeing with the primary transfer pricing 
adjustment due to the contracting state having a narrower domestic definition of the 
terms contained in the phrase “participation in the management, control or capital.” 
This risk is particularly high where one contracting state interprets control as de jure 
control, or as de facto control in the narrow sense, whilst the other contracting state 
interprets control as de facto control in the broad sense. The risk is also high where 
the contracting states apply different participation thresholds to participation in 
management or capital that is required for an associated enterprise relationship to 
exist. This is because the contracting state that is requested to make a corresponding 
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transfer pricing adjustment must agree with the primary adjustment in principle, 
otherwise, it is not required to make a corresponding adjustment.  
The following practical example illustrates the possibility of Article 9 providing no 
relief from economic double taxation if Cottani’s view were to be applied. This example 
requires one to assume that company A, which is a tax resident of Country A, has 
been subjected to a primary transfer pricing adjustment by the revenue authorities in 
Country A. The primary transfer pricing adjustment that company A has been 
subjected to arose since, according to the domestic laws of Country A, company A 
meets Country A’s shareholding participation requirement to be an associated 
enterprise in relation to company B. Hence, companies A and B are considered to be 
associated enterprises in relation to one another in terms of the domestic law of 
Country A. The revenue authorities of Country A may, therefore, apply their domestic 
law to make a primary transfer pricing adjustment if it establishes that company A and 
B’s transactions with each other were not arm’s length in nature.  
Since a primary transfer pricing adjustment is to be made domestically in Country 
A, company B will in all likelihood attempt to apply Article 9(2) of the DTA to obtain 
relief from economic double taxation. The terms in the phrase “participation in capital” 
in the DTA would, therefore, be defined in terms of the domestic legislation of Country 
B since Country B is the country “applying the convention.”263 Country B’s domestic 
legislation, however, does not consider company A and B to be associated to one 
another. The consequence of Country B not regarding company A and B to be 
associated enterprises under the domestic law of Country B, is that Country B can 
legitimately claim not to be required by Article 9 of the tax treaty with Country A to 
make the corresponding adjustment. This is because the transaction adjusted by 
Country A is not considered to be a “controlled transaction” under Article 9(1) of the 
applicable treaty as construed under the legislation of Country B.264 
The above example clearly illustrates that if a corresponding state has a narrower 
interpretation of the phrase “participates directly … in the management, capital or 
control” than the state that made the initial primary transfer pricing adjustment, then 
the corresponding state applying the DTA is not required to make a corresponding 
adjustment in terms of the DTA since the corresponding state will not agree with the 
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primary adjustment in principle. This interpretation, therefore, does not alleviate the 
possibility of economic double taxation from arising, which would support an 
interpretation that does not rely on the domestic meaning. 
 
4.5.1.1 Cottani’s qualification statement 
Although Cottani does not consider the context of Article 9 and whether it requires 
otherwise, Cottani does go on to highlight that “unavoidably, purely open-market 
situations will be covered by formulas covering de facto control,”265 for example where 
a supplier of materials for manufacturing is almost exclusively supplying a company 
that utilises those materials for their manufacturing operations. Cottani notes, 
however, that paragraph 2 of the Commentary to Article 9 provides that transfer pricing 
adjustments may not be made in the case of normal open-market commercial terms.266 
He relies on this part of the Commentary as authority to conclude that DTAs containing 
an article similar to Article 9(1) and (2) of the OECD MTC “permits an adjustment only 
in cases where double taxation would arise as a result of the adjustment, generally 
only in shareholding (including voting rights and interests in partnerships) and 
managerial relationships.”267  
So although Cottani concludes that the meaning of participation in “management, 
control or capital” is to be defined as per the domestic laws, Cottani qualifies this by 
appearing to suggest that certain forms of de facto control (ie, the broad interpretation 
of de facto control) are to be excluded from the applicability of Article 9. Further support 
for this view can be found in Vogel’s Commentary, wherein Kofler expresses the 
following: 
 
“[E]conomic control based on a market position is not to be considered ‘control’ falling within 
Article 9 OECD and UN MC. Indeed, it is not Article 9 OECD and UN MC’s purpose to 
interfere with the pricing between competing business interests, which is inevitably based 
on the relative strength and bargaining power of the truncation participants. This means 
that such market-based relationships (e.g., between a monopolist and customers, between 
two enterprises, one which is economically dependent on intangibles, goods or services of 
 







the other, or because of a creditor relationship) do not fall under Article 9 OECD and UN 
MC.”268 
 
Although Cottani’s view does resolve some of the issues that may arise from 
differing interpretations of the term “control” by relying on the Commentary to the MTC, 
this does not address the opposing thresholds that states have on the amount of 
participation required in management or capital for an associated enterprise to exist. 
The second observation that needs to be made pertains to how Cottani argues that 
de facto control is to be excluded, which on the face of it may appear contradictory to 
his view that the terms contained in the phrase “participation in the management, 
control or capital” are to be defined as per the domestic definition. In other words, on 
the one hand, Cottani seems to argue that the term “control” is to be defined in terms 
of domestic legislation. However, on the other hand, Cottani seems to be suggesting 
that the context, in this case, requires otherwise (due to the Commentary to the MTC) 
and therefore the domestic definitions are to be limited. So despite Cottani arguing 
that domestic definitions are to be used, and hence allowing for economic double 
taxation to arise, he appears to refute his own argument by saying that the 
Commentary excludes de facto control in the broad sense (and therefore that the 
context requires a deviation from the domestic definition). 
If, however, Cottani is arguing that only the term “control” is to be ascribed a 
meaning without reference to domestic law due to the context of that term stemming 
from the Commentary, then Cottani’s qualification statement does not undermine his 
argument, but instead suggests that Cottani’s argument that domestic law meanings 
are to be used only applies to the terms contained in the phrase “participates in 
management or capital”.  
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4.5.1.2 Some thoughts on whether economic double taxation can be avoided by 
determining which single respective contracting state’s domestic 
interpretation is to be applied in terms of Article 3(2) – The “new 
approach” 
Assuming that Cottani’s view is to be applied in practice, the following paragraph 
considers whether economic double taxation could be avoided by only applying the 
domestic meaning of one contracting state to the phrase “participation in 
management, control or capital”. 
Some academics have expressed that “[w]hile in the past an interpretation in light 
of domestic law could lead to double taxation …, this problem is now resolved by the 
new approach.”269 The so-called “new approach” seems to stem from the wording 
contained in Article 23 A and B of the OECD MTC, which is intended to eliminate 
juridical double taxation from arising due to qualification conflicts. 
This view that the “new approach” eliminates double taxation from arising due to 
the existence of differing definitions of undefined DTA terms is evident from Rust’s 
statements in Vogel’s Commentary, wherein Rust states that “[i]f the particular 
preconditions of a distributive rule are at issue, different qualifications may lead to 
double taxation not being avoided ….”270 Rust then refers to the views developed by 
the International Tax Group that was chaired by J.F Avery Jones. According to this 
view, which was developed in consideration of Article 23 of the OECD MTC, the 
contracting state in which the person is resident must interpret the undefined term in 
accordance with the domestic interpretation of the contracting state in which the 
income was sourced.271 Such an interpretation of the application of Article 23 results 
in juridical double taxation being avoided. 
As will be recalled from paragraph 4.5.1 of this chapter, economic double taxation 
may arise in the case of a transfer pricing adjustment in instances where the two 
contracting states have differing interpretations of the phrase “participates directly … 
in the management, control or capital.” When considering whether the “new approach” 
will be applicable for purposes of enforcing a corresponding state to provide a 
 
269 Rust “Article 3(2) OECD and UN MC” in Klaus Vogel on double taxation conventions 216. 
270 209. 
271 JF Avery Jones “The “one true meaning” of a tax treaty” (2001) Bulletin – Tax Treaty 





corresponding transfer pricing adjustment, the first thing that comes to mind is the 
irreconcilable difference between the new approach and the OECD Commentary on 
Article 9 providing that a contracting state is not obliged to provide a corresponding 
adjustment to the extent that such contracting state disagrees with the primary 
adjustment in principle. Lang also acknowledges that the corresponding state will not 
make a corresponding transfer pricing adjustment where the corresponding state 
holds a diverging opinion regarding the applicability of a DTA provision identical to 
Article 9(1) of the OECD MTC.272  
The second issue that needs to be considered is the fact that the new approach 
requires the DTA to be interpreted in accordance with the view of the contracting state 
in which the income was sourced. This is arguably an arbitrary method of preventing 
economic double taxation from arising as a result of transfer pricing adjustments 
because the arm’s length principle is not a distributive rule (and the source of the 
income is irrelevant to whether the arm’s length principle has been followed). This 
submission is arguably further supported by the fact that the primary transfer pricing 
adjustment may even be an adjustment made to an expense as opposed to income, 
therefore there may not even be income (or a source of income) to consider. This 
further supports the argument that the “new approach” does not solve the issue of 
economic double taxation in cases regarding the computation of income.273 The new 
approach may therefore arguably have to be adapted, to the extent that it is to apply 
to Article 9 so that the DTA is interpreted in accordance with the State that made the 
initial primary adjustment. Such an approach would result in the avoidance of 
economic double taxation from arising because multinational groups that have been 
subjected to an initial transfer pricing adjustment will then automatically be entitled to 
a corresponding adjustment (regardless of whether the contracting state that is 
requested to make the corresponding adjustment disagrees with the initial adjustment 
in principle due to it having a narrower interpretation of the phrase “participation in 
management, control or capital”).  
It should further be borne in mind that Article 23 uses the words “which may be 
taxed in the other Contracting State”. Article 9(2), on the other hand, does not use 
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those words, which, arguably, further supports the view that the "New approach" does 
not apply to Article 9. 
 
4.5.1.3 Administrative considerations pertaining to corresponding adjustments 
According to the OECD Commentary on Article 9, there is no specified method by 
which corresponding transfer pricing adjustments are to be made. The Commentary, 
therefore, suggests that the method to provide a corresponding adjustment is left open 
for contracting states to agree on. 274 The Commentary then goes on to provide two 
possible methods of giving effect to a corresponding transfer pricing adjustment in a 
case where enterprise X’s taxable income has been adjusted upwards (thereby 
ultimately resulting in its associated enterprise, enterprise Y, being deemed to have 
over-stated its taxable income). One of these proposed methods is to re-open 
enterprise Y’s tax assessment and to reduce its taxable income accordingly.275 
The other method mentioned in the Commentary, on the other hand, requires one 
to view enterprise Y’s income as having been taxed twice (that is; once in its resident 
state, and once in the resident state of its associated enterprise – enterprise X). This 
would result in the applicability of Article 23 of the OECD MTC, to the extent that such 
identical provision is contained in an applicable DTA. This means that the “double-
taxed profits” of enterprise Y should be treated in the hands of enterprise Y (which is 
a resident of State B) as if they may be taxed in State A (which is the resident state of 
enterprise Y’s relevant associated enterprise, enterprise X). 
Applying this secondary method to giving effect to a corresponding adjustment 
would undoubtedly also prevent economic double taxation from arising. Whether all 
contracting states will be willing to apply this method, however, remains to be seen. 
Contracting states may be unwilling to provide corresponding adjustments that result 
in a loss to the fiscus. Contracting states may well, therefore, decide to argue that this 
latter method is incompatible with Article 9 because Article 9 is not a provision that 
distributes taxing rights, but instead, the purpose of Article 9 is to adjust the profits of 
two associated enterprises that have entered into an arrangement on a non-arm’s 
length basis. It is therefore arguably untenable to conclude that it is enterprise Y’s 
income that is taxed both in its resident state as well as in the resident state of its 
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associated enterprise (enterprise X). It is enterprise X’s income, not enterprise Y’s 
income, that is being taxed in enterprise X’s residence state. This means that 
enterprise Y’s income is not taxable in two states, but instead, it is a different entity’s 
income that is taxable in the other state. Article 23 may therefore not apply in cases 
where Article 9 is applicable. The first-mentioned method of obtaining a corresponding 
adjustment would arguably, therefore, need to be relied on by the taxpayer to be 
alleviated from economic double taxation. 
 
4.5.2 Application of Article 3(2) in relation to Article 9 where it is accepted that the 
context requires otherwise (Dwarkasing’s view) 
Dwarkasing agrees with Cottani that the party seeking to obtain a corresponding 
transfer pricing adjustment, after a contracting state made a primary transfer pricing 
adjustment in terms of that state’s domestic laws, will need to request such adjustment 
to be made as per an applicable DTA.276 Dwarkasing also agrees with the view taken 
by Cottani regarding the fact that the terms contained in the phrase “participation in 
management, control or capital” are undefined and therefore fall within the ambit of 
Article 3(2).277 
Unlike Cottani, however, Dwarkasing does not argue that the terms contained in 
the phrase “participation in management, control or capital” are to be defined by the 
domestic definition of the relevant contracting state(s). Instead, Dwarkasing argues 
that the context requires otherwise. (Dwarkasing’s reasons for this conclusion are 
elaborated on in the paragraph below.) The application of an autonomous meaning to 
an undefined term in cases regarding computation of income has previously been 
supported by academics.278 Dwarkasing goes on to state that since DTAs effectively 
limit the applicability of a contracting states’ domestic laws, “broader concepts of 
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associated enterprises will be overruled by the narrower concept of associated 
enterprises of the appropriate tax treaty.”279 
Regarding what constitutes “context”, Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (1969) provides that “context” includes the text, the preamble to the 
tax treaty and annexes.280 
Dwarkasing argues that “the concept of associated enterprises under Article 9 of 
the OECD Model is based on a dominating or controlling participation in capital or 
management.”281 He refers to Article 5 of the 1933 Report by the League of Nations’ 
Fiscal Committee,282 which is the predecessor to Article 9 of the OED MTC and initially 
introduced the arm’s length principle.283 Article 5 read as follows: 
 
“When an enterprise of one contracting State has a dominant participation in the 
management or capital of an enterprise of another contracting State, or when both 
enterprises are owned or controlled by the same interests, and as the result of such 
situation there exists, in their commercial or financial relations, conditions different from 
those which would have been made between independent enterprises, any item of profit or 
loss which should normally have appeared in the accounts of one enterprise, but which has 
been, in this manner, diverted to the other enterprise, shall be entered in the accounts of 
such former enterprise, subject to the rights of appeal allowed under the law of the State of 
such enterprise.” 
 
Dwarkasing argues that the term “participation in control” is not meant to be an 
independent trigger for association, but rather the term is a substitute for the term 
“dominant” as was used in Article 5 of the 1933 Report.284 Therefore, Dwarkasing 
submits that the concept of associated enterprises is a concept based on de jure 
control that follows from company law. The view that the concept of associated 
enterprises under Article 9 covers de facto control in the broad sense should therefore, 
Dwarkasing argues, be rejected.285 
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4.5.3 Similarities and differences between Dwarkasing’s view and the UK domestic 
law 
One cannot ignore the obvious similarities between Dwarkasing’s view and the 
domestic position of the UK. The latter bears the greatest similarity to the OECD 
MTC’s wording of the states that are assessed in this dissertation. As has been 
discussed in chapter 3 of this dissertation, the level of participation required in 
management or capital in order to trigger the associated enterprise definition is to such 
extent that the affairs of the enterprise are conducted in accordance with the person 
in question’s wishes. This may arguably further support Dwarkasing’s view and would 
provide much-needed certainty and uniformity to the application of Article 9 
(particularly concerning the level of participation required in management or capital). 
There is, however, no consensus between the UK’s domestic law and Dwarkasing’s 
view as to whether the term “control” constitutes an independent trigger for 
association. As will be recalled from chapter 3, I argue that the UK does, in fact, 
consider the term “control” as a distinct trigger for association. Dwarkasing, however, 
does not.286  
It will also be recalled from chapter 3 that the United States, India and SA’s domestic 
laws all contain the term “control”, which is defined to include de facto control in all 
these states. Considering that all these above-mentioned states interpret “control” as 
a stand-alone criteria that may give rise to an associated enterprise relationship, an 
argument could be made that this consistent approach by the above-mentioned states 
in interpreting “control” constitutes context indicating that these states may have 
intended for the term “control” to be a separate trigger for association (which would 
include a form of de facto control). The Commentary makes it apparent, however, that 
de facto control in the broad sense ought not to trigger the application of Article 9.287 
Considering the above, it appears that support for Dwarkasing’s view that an 
autonomous meaning should be applied to the phrase “participation in management, 
control or capital” should be supported. That being said, Avery Jones has previously 
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pointed out the possibility “for courts in each of the treaty countries to come to different 
decisions on what each considers to be the ‘one true meaning’ of the treaty.”288 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Cottani appears to be of the view that one must interpret the terms in the phrase 
“participates on the management or capital” in accordance with the domestic law of 
the state applying the treaty, which according to Cottani is the state in which one is 
seeking a corresponding transfer pricing adjustment for the sake of relief from 
economic double taxation. Regarding the interpretation of the term “control,” the 
domestic law is limited in terms of the interpretation of Article 9 as envisioned by the 
Commentary thereto (which provides that transfer pricing adjustments may not be 
made in the case of normal open-market commercial terms).289 Cottani relies on this 
part of the Commentary as authority to conclude that DTAs containing an article similar 
to Article 9(1) and (2) of the OECD MTC “permits an adjustment only in cases where 
double taxation would arise as a result of the adjustment, generally only in 
shareholding and managerial relationships.”290 This suggests that Cottani does not 
consider control to include de facto control in the broad sense. His approach initially 
seems contradictory in the sense that he does not exclusively favour either the 
domestic law of the contracting states or the context of Article 9 (in the form of the 
Commentary thereto). If, however, Cottani is arguing that only the term “control” is to 
be ascribed a meaning without reference to domestic law due to the context of that 
term stemming from the Commentary, then Cottani’s qualification statement does not 
contradict his initial argument relying on domestic law, but instead suggests that 
Cottani’s argument that domestic law meanings are to be used only applies to the 
terms contained in the phrase “participates in management or capital”. 
Dwarkasing, on the other hand, is of the view that the context requires otherwise 
than relying on the domestic meaning of the undefined terms.291 After referring to the 
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context of Article 9 in the form of a historical analysis thereof, Dwarkasing concludes 
that the term “participation in control” is not meant to be an independent trigger for 
association, but rather the term is a substitute for the term “dominant”.292 Therefore, 
Dwarkasing submits that the concept of associated enterprises is a concept based on 
de jure control that follows from company law.  
The author hereof respectfully submits that the OECD MTC Commentary on Article 
9 (providing that a corresponding primary transfer pricing adjustment is only required 
if the other state agrees in principle with the initial adjustment), together with the 
purpose of the OECD MTC (to avoid economic double taxation from arising) supports 
the argument that the context requires undefined terms in Article 9 to be interpreted 
otherwise (ie, not in accordance with the domestic meaning of the Contracting State 
applying the convention).  
This view is further supported by the OECD’s Commentary providing that normal 
open-market commercial arrangements should not trigger an adjustment. It could be 
argued that this Commentary adds context to the term “control”, requiring broad 
interpretations of the term (which consider normal commercial relationships to 
constitute control) to be disregarded. 
Considering the historical context of Article 9, together with the purpose thereof, the 
view that direct participation in management or capital is to be interpreted as meaning 
that a person requires a dominant level of participation in management or capital to 
be associated ought to be favoured. Such a view would resolve economic double 
taxation from arising without the need for further amendments to DTAs.  
When considering the domestic laws of the UK, the United States, India and SA, it 
appears that all of these states make use of the word “control” in their domestic tax 
laws (which consists of de facto control in the narrow sense, except for India which 
interprets de facto control in the broad sense). This may also constitute context for 
purposes of Article 3(2). This particular context may arguably suggest that contracting 
states did, in fact, intend for the term “control” to be a distinct trigger for association. 
The Commentary to Article 9 must also be considered for purposes of context when 
applying Article 3(2). The Commentary expresses that transfer pricing adjustments 
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may not be made in the case of normal open-market commercial terms,293 which can 
arguably be considered to mean that de facto control in the broad sense does not 
constitute “control”. It seems apparent that Cottani supports this view. 
Based on the above, it appears that there are at least two possible solutions to 
eliminating economic double taxation from arising as a result of a primary transfer 
pricing adjustment. The first being for contracting states to agree to an autonomous or 
universal definition of associated enterprise (which would arguably require consensus 
amongst both contracting states that the context of Article 9 requires otherwise than 
to interpret the terms therein in accordance with the domestic law of a particular 
Contracting State). The alternative would be for contracting states to apply the 
modified “new approach” (that is; the DTA is to be interpreted in accordance with the 
Contracting State applying the DTA), which would arguably require contracting states 
to ignore the existing paragraph 6 of the Commentary on Article 9 of the OECD MTC 
(which provides that a corresponding state is not obliged to make a corresponding 
transfer pricing adjustment if it disagrees with the initial transfer pricing adjustment).  
On the other hand, where not all contracting states agree to apply the modified “new 
approach” by ignoring the existing paragraph 6 of the Commentary on Article 9 of the 
OECD MTC, taxpayers will have no option but to argue that Article 3(2) of the 
applicable DTA, together with the context of Article 9 of the applicable DTA, requires 
one to interpret the phrase “participates in management, control or capital” in 
accordance with the context of Article 9 (as opposed to in accordance with any 
particular Contracting State’s domestic law).  
The application of an autonomous meaning to the undefined terms, in my view, 
would theoretically provide increased conformity amongst all contracting states, 
particularly given that some states interpret control as de facto control in the narrow 
sense whilst others interpret it in the broad sense (which I am of the view is 
inconsistent with the context of Article 9, particularly the Commentary thereto stating 
that normal open-market conditions are not covered by the arms-length principle). 
However, given the increased pressure on almost every fiscus worldwide, together 
with the fact that the revenue authority of a Contracting State that is asked to make a 
corresponding adjustment would lose out on tax revenue if it were to adhere to such 
request, revenue authorities are unlikely to concede to such argument in practice 
 





(leaving the decision to be decided by way of a Mutual Agreement Procedure, which 
has been criticised for being a challenging dispute resolution forum in Africa). 294 
Considering the increased risk of an adversarial interaction between the taxpayer and 
the revenue authority of the Contracting State being requested to make a 
corresponding adjustment, it would seem that relying on the first above-mentioned 
method (that is; for contracting states to agree to an autonomous or universal definition 
of associated enterprise) may result in fewer disputes pertaining to economic double 
taxation from arising. 
Regardless of whether the relevant contracting states decide to ignore the existing 
paragraph 6 of the Commentary on Article 9 of the OECD MTC, the context of Article 
9 of the OECD MTC (particularly in the form of the Commentary thereto) requires the 
contracting states to interpret the term “control” in such manner that it does not include 
normal open market relationships. The term “control” therefore constitutes de facto 
control in the narrow sense. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
5.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter hereof, the general purpose of this 
dissertation is to establish how to interpret the phrase “participat[ion] … in the 
management, control or capital” under an article of a DTA (which mirrors Article 9 of 
the OECD MTC), which is central to establishing whether an “associate enterprise” 
exist, from a South African perspective. The understanding of this phrase has become 
particularly pertinent in SA after the amendment to the “affected transaction” definition 
to include cross-border transactions entered into between associated enterprises. 
However, despite SA’s amendment, the effective date of the amendment was 
postponed to a year after the amendment was effected. 295 The reason for this delay 
was due to uncertainty in interpreting the term associated enterprise.296  
This dissertation specifically examines two distinct ways of interpreting the relevant 
phrase. One being an interpretation that, due to the fact that the OECD MTC does not 
define the terms contained in the phrase “participates in the management, control or 
capital,” relies on an article of a DTA (which mirrors Article 3(2) of the OECD MTC) to 
interpret the undefined terms in accordance with domestic legislation. The second 
being whether the context provides otherwise and therefore requires one not to follow 
the domestic legislation’s definition of an associated enterprise, and rather interpret 
the undefined terms in accordance with the context.  
In addition to comprehending how to interpret the content of Article 9, which requires 
one to apply Article 3(2), the relationship between DTAs (with provisions identical to 
Article 9 of the OECD MTC) and domestic transfer pricing laws require consideration 
to understand what legal impact such a DTA provision has on taxpayers. 
 
5.2 Preliminary point regarding the Explanatory Memorandum on the 
Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2019 
 Interestingly, the Explanatory Memorandum to the amendment states the following:  
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“The fact that South Africa does not have or use the concept of associated enterprises 
when applying the arm’s length principle presents a challenge in application of the transfer 
pricing rules in respect of transactions between “associated enterprises” that are not 
regarded connected persons.”297 
 
Based on the content of the Explanatory Memorandum, it seems that some 
professionals are of the view that the term “associated enterprise” is broader than the 
term “connected person”. Based on the findings of this dissertation, it is unlikely for 
this to ever be the case, regardless of whether one interprets the term “associated 
enterprise” in accordance with one of the contracting states’ domestic law (as 
proposed by Cottani), or whether one interprets the terms autonomously without 
reference to a contracting state’s domestic law (as proposed by Dwarkasing). One 
conceivable scenario in which this may arise is if one were to apply Cottani’s view, 
and the term “associated enterprise” were interpreted in accordance with India’s 
domestic law (because India defines “control” as including a closed list of general 
open-market relationships, such as inter alia a supplier dependency relationship).298 
However, even Cottani concedes that the Commentary to the OECD MTC provides 
that normal open market conditions (which arguably can include a supplier 
dependency relationship) ought not to be considered to be a transaction between 
associated enterprises. The only indefensible way that the term “associated 
enterprise” could possibly be broader than the term “connected person” is if one 
follows Cottani’s approach, and the contracting state whose domestic law is relied on 
to interpret the term “associated enterprise” contains a lower participation threshold 
for an associated enterprise relationship to exist. Given that the connected person’s 
share participation requirement is, in some instances, 20%, it seems unlikely for this 
to ever be the case. 
 
5.3 The relationship between domestic legislation and double taxation 
agreements 
Since both of the two distinct methods of interpretation that are considered by this 
dissertation (that is, interpreting the undefined terms in question in accordance with 
domestic law, or alternatively applying an autonomous interpretation) rely on the 
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interpretation of a DTA, it is material for one to first grasp an understanding of what 
legal effect a DTA has domestically, particularly in instances where a DTA conflicts 
with domestic legislation. 
After having analysed the prevailing legislation, Commentary and case law from 
SA, the USA, the UK and India, it appears that two general methods to address conflict 
between DTAs and domestic legislation exist. The first being that a state can provide 
for rules that provide that one rule prevails over another (the lex superior derogate 
inferiori rule), such as in the UK. The second general method identified in this analysis 
is the ordinary principles of legislative interpretation, particularly the lex specialis 
derogat legi generali rule (such as in SA and India). Although the United States utilises 
domestic legislation to address conflicts between DTAs and domestic legislation, the 
content of that legislation stems from ordinary principles of legislative interpretation. 
Unlike SA and India, however, the United States does not apply the lex specialis rule. 
Instead, the United States applies the posterior derogate priori rule. Later-enacted 
domestic legislation can, therefore, supersede existing DTAs in the United States. The 
United States is therefore different from SA, India and the UK in the sense that the 
United States does not give preference to a DTA over domestic legislation per se. 
Instead, the United States enforces the later-enacted provision, whether or not from a 
DTA or domestic legislation. 
From a South African perspective, the only legal basis for a transfer pricing 
adjustment is in terms of the application of section 31 of the Income Tax Act. The 
impact of the lex specialis derogat legi generali rule in relation to section 31 of the 
Income Tax Act and a DTA provision identical to Article 9 of the OECD MTC is that 
such DTA provision restricts the application of section 31 of the Income Tax Act. This 
restriction is in the form of a prohibition of a transfer pricing adjustment in instances 
where the transaction in question falls outside the ambit of a DTA provision identical 
to Article 9 of the OECD MTC. Where such transaction is not between associated 
enterprises as per Article 9 of the OECD MTC, a transfer pricing adjustment would not 
be allowed. A further noteworthy point to mention relating to the impact of the lex 
specialis derogat legi generali rule in relation to section 31 of the Income Tax Act and 
a DTA provision identical to Article 9 of the OECD MTC is that any amendment to 
section 31 of the Income Tax Act resulting in a broadening of the scope of a transfer 





of section 31 of the Income Tax Act is limited by a DTA provision identical to Article 9 
of the OECD MTC.299 
 
5.4 Differing domestic definitions of the term “associated enterprise” (or 
terms in lieu thereof) 
Before dealing with how to correctly interpret the term “associated enterprise,” one 
needs to be aware of the fact that different states have differing definitions for the 
phrase “participates directly … in the management, control or capital” (or a comparable 
phrase).  
Based on chapter 3 of this dissertation, one can see that the proliferation of 
unilateral measures has resulted in some inconsistencies in the domestic approaches 
to determining what transactions should fall within the net of the domestic transfer 
pricing legislation. However, there are also a number of similarities amongst the 
various domestic approaches. The inconsistencies in the domestic approaches can 
initially be identified from the fact that different terminology is utilised by different 
states, albeit that the differing terminologies seem to aim to cater for the same thing 
(being connectivity to another). India uses the term “associated enterprise,” which is 
inter alia defined as a person that participates in the control, management, or the 
capital of a company. In the UK, the “participation condition” must be met, which 
requires one of the affected persons to be directly or indirectly participating in the 
management, control or capital of the other. In the United States, a transfer pricing 
adjustment may be made if at least two organisations are owned or controlled by the 
same interests. Lastly, in SA, the contracting parties need to be connected persons 
(which includes parties that are managed or controlled by another, as well as various 
participation requirements pertaining to capital), or (as of January 2021 (or 2022, if the 
draft amendment in terms of Clause 78 of the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 2020 is 
accepted)) an associated enterprise in relation to each other. 
The evident similarities in the various domestic approaches is that they all include 
some form of interest in the management, capital or control of an entity. On the other 
hand, the most important differences that need to be mentioned are the differences in 
the level of participation required in capital or management, and differences in 
 






interpretation of what constitutes control amongst the above-mentioned states (being 
de jure control, de facto control in the narrow sense, and de facto control in the broad 
sense that includes various open market arrangements). 
Regarding the level of participation required, direct participation is defined in the UK 
as participation in capital or management to the extent that one has control. The level 
of participation required is therefore generally more than 50% in capital (together with 
voting rights) or management. In the United States, it is the reality of the control that 
is decisive, not its form or the mode of its existence. More than 50% participation would 
therefore generally also be required in the United States. This general position may 
arguably not apply in instances where it can be proven that there are apathetic 
shareholders or board members that have resulted in a person obtaining control with 
less than 50% participation in capital or management. South African domestic 
legislation imposes a participation requirement of 20% if no other holder of shares 
holds the majority voting rights. Alternatively, the participation requirement is more 
than 50%, to the extent that the arrangement does not pertain to financial assistance 
or IP (in which case the participation requirement is 20%). In India, the participation 
requirement is 26% shareholding, which is considerably less than what is generally 
required in the UK and the United States. 
Regarding “control”, the differing approaches of interpretation were identified. First, 
forms of de jure control that are limited to control in the form of shareholding or 
management or control stemming from a document governing a company (such as a 
memorandum of incorporation), which is applied by states such as the UK. Secondly, 
de facto control that is based on an open-ended concept of control in reality, as applied 
by states such as the USA. Finally, an interpretation of control that covers a broad 
interpretation of de facto control that includes certain open market arrangements, as 
applied by states such as India. 
Regarding the differences in interpretation of what constitutes control, direct 
participation is defined in the UK as participation in capital or management to the 
extent that one has control. This is generally referred to as de jure control. The UK, 
however, also considers a person to control a company if, as a result of any powers 
conferred by the articles of association or other document regulating that company, 
the company is conducted in accordance with that person’s wishes. 
Control is also defined in the US domestic legislation. Unlike the UK, however, the 





evident from the United States’ domestic legislation is that it is not the form of control 
that is material, but rather it is the reality of control that is decisive.  
Although control is not expressly defined by India’s domestic legislation, Indian 
domestic legislation does specifically stipulate that the relationships listed therein are 
indicative of a controlled relationship existing. These listed relationships generally 
provide for de jure control and de facto control in the broad sense that includes open 
market arrangements. 
The South African domestic law definition of a connected person also refers to the 
term “control,” which the South African courts have held means de facto control.300 
However, it is submitted that the form of de facto control referred to in Interpretation 
Note 67, as well as in the court cases referred to therein, is narrower than the types of 
relationships that India considers to give rise to de facto control. This submission is 
based on the fact that SA’s interpretation of de facto control considers whether there 
is in substance control via management. The connected person definition, however, 
also appears to be broad enough to possibly include persons that can control a 
company by virtue of some form of power conferred by that company’s memorandum 
of incorporation or some other document governing the company (as is the case in the 
UK, and arguably also the US). An example may include the power given by a 
company to an independent creditor (by way of an amendment to the document 
regulating that borrowing company) to veto any decisions pertaining to the company’s 
capital expenditure or acquisitions, or the incurral of further debt or any other material 
arrangement. 
The above analysis clearly illustrates that the above-mentioned states do not all 
impose an identical participation level required to give rise to association, nor do they 
all interpret the term “control” identically domestically. Regarding the latter, the two 
predominant interpretations are de jure control and de facto control, and de facto 
control also appears to be capable of being interpreted in a narrow manner as well as 
a broad manner that includes certain open market arrangements. The narrow 
interpretation appears to aim at regarding entities that are in substance controlled by 
another via management, while the broad interpretation appears to include certain 
commercial relationships that may give rise to one entity being commercially 
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dependent on the other. This may well give rise to uncertainty when interpreting the 
term “control” in a DTA, which was addressed in chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
5.5 Findings from the critical analysis of the two predominant (and opposing) 
views on interpreting Article 9 
The first of the two predominant views on interpreting Article 9 considered in this 
dissertation requires that one must interpret the term “associated enterprise” in 
accordance with the domestic law of the state applying the treaty, which according to 
Cottani is the state in which one is seeking a corresponding transfer pricing adjustment 
for the sake of relief from economic double taxation. The domestic law, however, is 
limited in terms of the interpretation of Article 9 as envisioned by the Commentary 
thereto (which provides that transfer pricing adjustments may not be made in the case 
of normal open market commercial terms). 301  Cottani relies on this part of the 
Commentary as authority to conclude that DTAs containing an article similar to Article 
9(1) and (2) of the OECD MTC “permits an adjustment only in cases where double 
taxation would arise as a result of the adjustment, generally only in shareholding and 
managerial relationships.”302 This suggests that Cottani does not consider control to 
include de facto control in the broad sense. Cottani’s approach, however, does not 
currently always result in the avoidance of economic double taxation, nor does it 
answer the question as to what level of participation in capital is required to trigger an 
associated enterprise relationship. His approach is also contradictory in the sense that 
he does not exclusively favour either an interpretation in accordance with the domestic 
law of the contracting states or the context of Article 9 (in the form of the Commentary 
thereto). 
Dwarkasing, on the other hand, is of the view that the context requires otherwise 
than relying on the domestic meaning of the undefined terms. After referring to the 
context of Article 9 in the form of a historical analysis thereof, Dwarkasing concludes 
that the phrase “participation in control” is not meant to be an independent trigger for 
association, but rather that the term is a substitute for the term “dominant”. Therefore, 
Dwarkasing submits that the concept of associated enterprises is a concept based on 
de jure control that follows from company law.303  
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The author hereof respectfully submits that the OECD MTC Commentary on Article 
9 (providing that a corresponding primary transfer price (“TP”) adjustment is only 
required if the other state agrees in principle with the initial adjustment), together with 
the purpose of the OECD MTC (to avoid economic double taxation from arising) 
supports the argument that the context requires undefined terms in Article 9 to be 
interpreted otherwise (that is, not in accordance with the domestic meaning of the 
contracting state applying the convention). This view is further supported by the 
OECD’s Commentary providing that normal open market commercial arrangements 
should not trigger an adjustment. It could be argued that this Commentary adds 
context to the term “control”, requiring broad interpretations of the term (which consider 
normal commercial relationships to constitute control) to be disregarded. 
Considering the historical context of Article 9, together with the purpose thereof, 
direct participation in management or capital ought to be interpreted as meaning that 
a person requires a dominant level of participation in management or capital in order 
to be associated. Furthermore, considering the domestic laws of the UK, the United 
States, India and SA, it appears that all of these states make use of the word “control” 
in their domestic tax laws as a stand-alone requirement. This may also constitute 
context for purposes of Article 3(2). This particular context may arguably suggest that 
contracting states did in fact intend for the term “control” to be a distinct trigger for 
association, and that a form of de facto control would constitute “control”. The 
Commentary to Article 9 must also be considered for purposes of context when 
applying Article 3(2). The Commentary expresses that transfer pricing adjustments 
may not be made in the case of normal open market commercial terms,304 which can 
arguably be considered to mean that de facto control in the broad sense does not 
constitute “control”. The form of de facto control that is to fall within the ambit of the 
term “associated enterprise” should therefore be limited to de facto control in the 
narrow sense.  
Considering the broad scope of de facto control in the narrow sense, it seems more 
likely than not that any minority shareholder may even potentially be the person that 
effectively makes all the decisions of the company, thereby resulting in that company 
being de facto controlled by that particular minority shareholder (regardless of whether 
a different shareholder holds the majority in equity shares or voting rights). An example 
 





of how a minority shareholder may exercise de facto control is if that shareholder has 
the majority voting rights at a specific shareholders meeting where certain decisions 
are made regarding the acquisition or disposal of assets, or to incur a liability.  
Some professionals in practice are of the view that control is wide enough to include 
exclusive distribution rights or offtake arrangements. In cases where this is the extent 
of the relationship, it is respectfully submitted that such contracting parties cannot 
constitute a connected person by virtue of de facto control. This submission is based 
on the premise that the person entering into an agreement with the company does not 
factually have carte blanche to run the company. Of course, such commercial 
arrangement may influence the persons that run the company, however, that does not 
result in the “influencer” running the company (and thereby being in de facto control 
thereof in the narrow sense). The person who runs the company cannot be said to 
have relinquished itself from running the company and having given the “influencer” 
carte blanche to run the company. The company’s actions remain the result of the 
actions of the person who runs the company, not the person who influences that 
person who runs the company. The same can be said about creditors of a company; 
they may influence the person who runs the company by way of contractual rights 
entitling the lender to restrict the decisions of the borrower, but that does not per se 
give rise to the creditor running the company. Academics have also opined that mere 
economic dominance or dependence deriving from commercial relationships 
originating from de facto situations should not be confused with control.305  
On the other hand, where a company gives an independent creditor (by way of an 
amendment to the document regulating that borrowing company)306 the power to veto 
any decisions pertaining to the company’s capital expenditure or acquisitions, the 
incurral of further debt or any other material arrangement, it could be argued that such 
powers conferred upon the creditor in terms of the document regulating that borrowing 
company gives rise to a de facto controlling relationship in the narrow sense.  
 
 
305 Dwarkasing Associated Enterprises 237. 
306 The question whether amending the document regulating that borrowing company to 
cater for the lender in such manner is a question of company law, which falls outside the 
scope of this dissertation. To the extent that the document regulating that borrowing 
company remains unchanged, and the lender relies on a contractual right instead, then such 





Based on the above, it appears that there are at least two possible solutions to 
eliminating economic double taxation from arising as a result of a primary transfer 
pricing adjustment. The first being for contracting states to agree to an autonomous or 
universal definition of an associated enterprise (which would arguably require 
consensus amongst all contracting states that the context of Article 9 requires 
otherwise than to interpret the terms therein in accordance with the domestic law of a 
particular contracting state). The alternative would be for contracting states to apply 
the modified “new approach” (that is; the DTA is to be interpreted in accordance with 
the Contracting State applying the DTA), which would arguably require contracting 
states to ignore the existing paragraph 6 of the Commentary on Article 9 of the OECD 
MTC (which provides that a corresponding state is not obliged to make a 
corresponding transfer pricing adjustment if it disagrees with the initial transfer pricing 
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